Case: 25-7187, 02/17/2026, DktEntry: 37.2, Page 32 of 41
The inquiry does not turn on whether Congress anticipated every possible form of state interference; it turns on whether state law intrudes into a field Congress has reserved to federal regulation. While not needed given the explicit statutory language, preemptive intent may be inferred “if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good , 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). Such is the case here. CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) makes plain that Congress intended the CEA to occupy the field of “accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . . . traded or executed on a contract market . . . or any other board of trade, exchange, or market.” When an instrument is trading on a CFTC-regulated market as a “swap” or “future,” state gambling laws do not apply. CEA § 2(a)(1)(A)’s “exclusive jurisdiction” over futures and swaps traded on a DCM “preempts the application of state law.” Leist v. Simplot , 638 F.2d 283, 322 (2d Cir. 1980). “Precisely, preemption is appropriate ‘[w]hen application of state law would directly affect trading on or the operation of a futures market.’” Effex Cap., LLC v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 933 F.3d 882, 894 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Am. Agric. Movement, Inc v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago , 977 F.2d 1147, 1156 (7th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Time Warner Cable v. Doyle , 66 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 1995)). Offering event contracts on a DCM cannot, in and of itself,
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