Case 1:25-cv-12578-RGS Document 41-1 Filed 10/16/25 Page 5 of 24
one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns , 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Ignoring this history and longstanding principles of federal statutory interpretation, Robinhood now presents an alternate reality—one in which a statutory scheme whose scope is limited to addressing the risk, discovery, and dissemination of commodity pricing information, see 7 U.S.C. § 5(a)–(b)—exclusively governs nationwide sports betting, including that which occurs on Indian lands, thereby repealing the comprehensive regulatory scheme set forth in IGRA. Clearly, this cannot be the case. Any preemptive effect that the CEA has only applies to lawful transactions that fall under the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). Robinhood’s sports event contracts are neither. 1. The CEA does not give CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over gaming-related sports event contracts. Robinhood rests its case on its argument that the CEA grants “exclusive jurisdiction” to the CFTC “with respect to accounts, agreements, … and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery …,” id. , and therefore preempts state law and, by effect, repeals the applicability of IGRA. However, as will be discussed below, the gaming-related sports events contracts at issue here do not qualify as “swaps” and as a result, the CEA does not grant the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over the contracts. Moreover, this exclusive jurisdiction is not universal; this same provision also provides a savings clause, which states, “[e] xcept as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall … supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or of any State ….” Id. (emphasis added).
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