Case 1:25-cv-12578-RGS Document 41-1 Filed 10/16/25 Page 13 of 24
Because the self-certification provisions improperly delegate Kalshi the authority to perform a core governmental function without any clear guiding principles, standards, or limitations, Robinhood’s sports event contracts offered pursuant thereto are invalid. B. The CEA does not impliedly repeal IGRA By arguing that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over sports betting (including that which occurs on Indian lands), Robinhood effectively argues that the CEA impliedly repealed IGRA. In a similar case before the Maryland District Court, Kalshi attempted to make this argument, stating that even if “IGRA’s definition of ‘gaming’” encompassed sports event contracts, “the CEA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision would displace any attempt by tribes to regulate those contracts.” Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Prelim. Inj. at 7, KalshiEX LLC v. Martin , No. 1:25-cv-01283-ABA (D. Md. May 19, 2025), ECF No. 29. Ultimately, the court disagreed with Kalshi and denied its motion for preliminary injunction, which is now on appeal before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. KalshiEX, LLC v. Martin , No. 1:25-cv-01283-ABA, 2025 WL 2194908 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2025). Congress did not express the requisite intent for implied repeal. In other words, if the Court accepts Robinhood’s position that its sports event contracts—which constitute sports betting and Class III gaming under IGRA—are subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, then the Court must also accept the underlying assumption that Congress intended to upend the entire federal framework for Indian gaming and repeal key provisions of IGRA. See, e.g. , 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Additionally, IGRA’s criminal provisions provide the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)with“exclusivejurisdiction”over criminal prosecutionsof applicable gambling laws in Indian country, unless a tribe agrees to transfer jurisdiction to the state. 18 U.S.C.
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