Case 1:25-cv-12578-RGS Document 41-1 Filed 10/16/25 Page 17 of 24
betting. Ambiguity is not “clear and manifest” intent, and an ambiguous statutory provision cannot overcome the strong presumption against repeals by implication. It also implicates the Indian canon of statutory construction that requires the ambiguous definition of “swaps” to be interpreted in favor of tribes to maintain IGRA and all its provisions. 14 In the absence of explicit congressional intent, this Court should uphold IGRA’s very clear, specific, and pervasive regulatory regime for gaming on Indian lands. Further, the legislative history of the CEA reveals Congress’s concern about event contracts facilitating sports betting. As mentioned above, the Special Rule’s principal drafter explained Congress intended to prevent gambling via event contracts. 156 Cong. Rec. S5906–7. Rather than demonstrate a “clear and manifest” intent to repeal IGRA, this legislative history shows the exact opposite: Congress designed the Special Rule to prevent sports betting through supposed event contracts. As to IGRA’s criminal provisions, Congress likewise did not express a clear and manifest intent to repeal DOJ’s authority. In fact, Congress expressly disclaimed such a repeal in the text of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(A) (“Nothing in this chapter shall supersede or preempt … criminal prosecution under any Federal criminal statute.”). It is impossible for the CFTC to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over sports event contracts while the DOJ exercises its exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of state gambling laws made applicable by IGRA to Indian lands.
14 To the extent IGRA grants the NIGC regulatory authority over gaming on Indian lands, Congress likewise did not express its “clear and manifest” intent to repeal that authority. In fact, as noted above, Congress expressly reserved it. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). 17
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