USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 44
Filed: 12/22/2025
Pg: 24 of 39
Kalshi cannot meet the “heavy burden” of proving Congress intended to repeal IGRA because there is a reasonable interpretation of the CEA that gives full effect to both statutes: the CEA’s definition of “swap”—and thus the CFTC’s jurisdiction—simply does not extend to Kalshi’s sports bets. The Supreme Court applies the “strong presumption that repeals by implication are disfavored and that Congress will specifically address preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). Congress’s intent to repeal must be “clear and manifest.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, IGRA and the CEA can easily be harmonized by reading the CEA to exclude sports betting. 1. Kalshi’s sports-betting contracts are not “swaps.” As relevant here, the CEA defines “swap” as “any agreement, contract, or transaction … that provides for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery … that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii). Kalshi’s sports-betting
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