USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 44
Filed: 12/22/2025
Pg: 32 of 39
18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1166, 1952, 1953, 1955 (incorporating state gambling prohibitions); Chicken Ranch , 42 F.4th at 1031 (explaining that IGRA strikes “a delicate balance” between tribal and state sovereignty over gaming). And even when Congress chose to prohibit sports betting nationally through PASPA, it did so through state regulation, rather than by directly regulating private actors. See Murphy , 584 at 484–85. Because Congress “has repeatedly confirmed that states have the primary authority to regulate” gaming, this Court should “demand ‘exceedingly clear language’” before concluding that the CEA preempts all state sports-betting laws. Capt. Gaston LLC , 76 F.4th at 299. No such language exists. Rather, the CEA actually reinforces the federal policy in favor of state gaming regulation by disclaiming preemption of state gaming laws. See 7 U.S.C. § 16(e). And nothing in the definition of “swap” indicates that Congress meant to overturn the entire field of state sports-betting regulations. Second, Congress already had a “‘distinct regulatory scheme’ in place to deal with the issue” of sports betting at the time of the CEA amendments: PASPA. Capt. Gaston LLC , 76 F.4th at 297 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson , 529 U.S. 120, 143–46 (2000)). The conflict between Kalshi’s argument that the CEA’s 2010 amendments authorized sports betting nationwide and the existence of
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