Case: 25-7516, 01/30/2026, DktEntry: 49.2, Page 11 of 41
Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 810 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]ribal gaming operations cannot be understood as mere profit-making ventures that are wholly separate from the Tribes’ core governmental functions.”). For tribes, gaming is not a “commercial” endeavor, but an existential one. Tribes have primary jurisdiction over their lands and activities occurring thereon. Tribes, like states, also have a strong sovereign interest in determining what gaming activities may take place on their lands. Thus, tribal jurisdiction extends to gaming, which has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians , 480 U.S. 202, 218–22 (1987); 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5). In 1988, Congress enacted IGRA “to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe … to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operators and players….” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2). Kalshi asks this court to subvert this longstanding and comprehensive regulatory regime. The consequences of Kalshi’s arguments are difficult to overstate. Its reading of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) would amount to a sub silentio reversal of congressional policy and Supreme court precedent; nullify existing tribal-state gaming compacts and regulatory frameworks; allow Kalshi to
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