Case: 25-7516, 01/30/2026, DktEntry: 49.2, Page 17 of 41
U.S.C. §§ 2701(5), 2710(d); 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d). Congress also must have intended to completely override the entire purpose and function of IGRA, which is to recognize tribal sovereignty to conduct and regulate gaming activity that occurs on Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5). No amount of judicial gymnastics can turn the insertion of the term “swap” in the CEA into such a radical transformation of IGRA. This Court should therefore reject Kalshi’s boundless interpretation of a “swap” and give effect to both statutes by excluding sports-betting contracts, such as Kalshi’s, from the CEA’s definition of “swap” as the lower court did. See 1- ER-13. Such an interpretation, in any case, is more faithful to the CEA’s statutory language and legislative intent. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5907 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Lincoln) (“It would be quite easy to construct an ‘event contract’ around sporting events such as the Super Bowl, the Kentucky Derby, and Masters Golf Tournament. These types of contracts would not serve any real commercial purpose. Rather, they would be used solely for gambling.”). C. Kalshi’s Theory Does Not Meet the Standard for Implied Repeals. Kalshi’s preemption argument, which relies on its overly broad interpretation of “swap,” must be rejected because it would manufacture an implied repeal of IGRA where none exists. Kalshi cannot meet the heavy burden of proving Congress intended to repeal IGRA because there is a reasonable
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