Case: 25-7516, 01/30/2026, DktEntry: 49.2, Page 19 of 41
1. Kalshi’s sports-betting contracts are not “swaps.” As relevant here, the CEA defines “swaps” as “any agreement, contract, or transaction … that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii). Kalshi’s sports-betting contracts simply do not fall under this definition and Congress therefore could not have intended to repeal IGRA. 6 First, Kalshi’s sports-event contracts are not dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence of a sports event—i.e., whether the sports event occurs—but rather on the outcome of the sports event (or parts thereof)—i.e., which team wins or who scores a touchdown. The court below held that sports bets are not swaps for precisely this reason. 1-ER-6–7; see also Crypto.com , 2025 WL 2916151, at *1, 7–9; Robinhood Derivatives, LLC v. Dreitzer , No. 2:25-cv-1541, 2025 WL 3283308, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 25, 2025).
6 Kalshi also argues that its preemption argument applies even if its sports-betting contracts are not swaps because they involve “excluded commodities.” Pl.- Appellant Br. at 46, ECF No. 20.1. But for the same reasons discussed herein, Kalshi’s sports-betting contracts likewise fail to meet the definition of “excluded commodities,” which is more restrictive than the definition of “swap” in that it requires an “ associated … financial, commercial, or economic consequence.” See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19).
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