Case: 25-7516, 01/30/2026, DktEntry: 49.2, Page 27 of 41
and federal gambling laws, but it does not create any additional substantive prohibitions.” California v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel , 898 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2018). II. The Major Questions Doctrine Forecloses Kalshi’s Theory. In 2010, federal law—namely, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”)—prohibited sports betting nationwide. Kalshi’s position thus requires interpreting the CEA not only to eradicate state and federal gaming laws by preemption or implied repeal, but also to reverse the federal policy that at the time prohibited sports betting—turning it instead into a nationwide authorization of such betting under the sole jurisdiction of the CFTC. 8 Whether Congress did so is a major question. Under the Major Questions Doctrine, courts have “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer” agency authority in cases where the agency has asserted a “breadth” of authority over matters of “economic and political significance.” West Virginia v. EPA , 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, considering “both separation of powers
8 Kalshi’s sports-betting contracts also violate other federal laws, including the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). If Congress authorized sports betting via the CEA in 2010, then it also effectively limited the scope of these federal laws, in addition to PASPA.
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