C. The CEA does not impliedly repeal IGRA In arguing that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over sports betting conducted on Indian lands, Kalshi asserts, in effect, that the CEA impliedly repealed IGRA. 9 But Congress did not express the requisite intent for implied repeal. The U.S. Supreme Court applies “the strong presumption that repeals by implication are ‘disfavored’ and that ‘Congress will specifically address’ preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a latter statute.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (quoting United States v. Fausto , 484 U.S. 439, 452 (1988)). Congress’s intent to repeal must be “clear and manifest.” Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of New York , 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). “[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). “[T]he only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.” Id. at 550 (citing Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co. , 324 U.S. 439, 456–57 (1945)). Further, “the specific governs the general,” particularly where “a general
9 Again, Kalshi made such an argument in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. See Pl.’s Reply in Support of Prelim. Inj., KalshiEX LLC v. Martin , No. 1:25-cv-01283-ABA, ECF No. 29 at 7 (D. Md. May 19, 2025).
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