permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific prohibition or permission.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012). Finally, the Indian Canons of Construction 10 require courts to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of tribes. Bryan v. Itasca County , 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976). If the Court accepts Kalshi’s position that its sports event contracts—which constitute sports betting and therefore Class III gaming under IGRA—are “swaps” subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, then the Court must also accept the underlying assumption that Congress intended to upend the entire federal framework for Indian gaming and repeal many key provisions of IGRA.. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Additionally, IGRA’s criminal provisions provide: The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under [18 U.S.C. § 1166] to Indian country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact . . . has consented to the transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe. 10 As the Supreme Court has explained: “Because Congress’ authority to legislate unilaterally on behalf of the Indians derives from the presumption that Congress will act with benevolence, courts “have developed canons of construction that treaties and other federal action should when possible be read as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favorable to Indians.” Hagen v. Utah , 510 U.S. 399, 423 n.1 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Cnty of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. , 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221 (1982 ed.)).
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