“[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Id. at 551. In that regard, “the specific governs the general,” particularly where “a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific prohibition or permission.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012). And under the Indian Canons of Construction, 10 courts must resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of tribes. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty , 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976). If the Court accepts Kalshi’s position that its sports event contracts—which constitute Class III gaming under IGRA—are “swaps” subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, then it must also accept that Congress intended to upend the entire federal framework for tribal gaming and repeal key provisions of IGRA. Congress had no such intent. As discussed above, the definition of “swaps” is, at best, ambiguous as to whether it includes sports event contracts. Ambiguity is not “clear and manifest” intent and an ambiguous statutory provision cannot overcome the strong presumption against repeals by implication. Ambiguity also implicates the Indian canon of statutory construction that requires the ambiguous definition of “swaps” to be interpreted in favor of tribes to maintain IGRA and all its provisions. 11 10 As the Justice Blackmun has concisely explained: Because Congress’ authority to legislate unilaterally on behalf of the Indians derives from the presumption that Congress will act with benevolence, courts “have developed canons of construction that treaties and other federal action should when possible be read as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favorable to Indians.” Hagen v. Utah , 510 U.S. 399, 423 n.1 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221 (1982 ed.)). 11 To the extent that IGRA grants the NIGC regulatory authority over gaming on Indian lands, Congress likewise did not express its “clear and manifest” intent to repeal that authority. In fact, Congress expressly reserved it. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
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