Case: 25-7831, 03/10/2026, DktEntry: 81.1, Page 20 of 43
Legally speaking, the CFTC’s interpretation of federal statutes fares no better. When Congress intends major changes to the existing state of the law, it speaks clearly, not obscurely. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns , 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). That matters here because the CFTC’s expansive preemption theory would be a seismic change to this country’s gambling laws. Consequently, the CFTC’s position does not work unless Congress made a clear statement of such broad preemptive intent. No such statement exists. As Nevada aptly explains, the text of the Commodity Exchange Act does not signal an intent to displace the States’ traditional authority over sports betting. And it certainly does not do so clearly. Among other things, betting on the score of a game, or the per- formance of an athlete, does not fit within the statutory definition of “swaps.” See 7 U.S.C. §§1a(47)(A), 2(a)(1)(A); Nevada Br.20–32. That financial-instrument descriptor simply “cannot bear” the weight that pre- diction markets place on it. See Learning Res., Inc. , 2026 WL 477534, at *6 (majority op.). In arguing otherwise, the CFTC resorts to a stilted, contextless reading of the statutory text. To add to the discussion, the amici States emphasize four points. First , the CFTC’s interpretation of federal statutes should receive no
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