Case: 25-7831, 03/10/2026, DktEntry: 81.1, Page 21 of 43
deference or special weight. Second , the CFTC’s new claim of expansive federal power solidifies that the major-questions doctrine applies to this case. Third , the CFTC’s reading of statutory law violates the federalism canon, under which courts expect Congress to speak clearly when it in- tends to significantly shift this country’s traditional balance of power. Fourth , considering practical expertise, it is especially unlikely that Con- gress would have replaced the States (which have considerable experi- ence regulating gambling) with the CFTC (which has no experience). I. The CFTC’s reading of federal statutes deserves no special weight. A. Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may preempt state law when it acts within the boundaries of its enumerated powers. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. But preemption is not a “freewheeling judicial in- quiry” by which courts guess at unstated “federal objectives.” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting , 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011) (quotations omitted). Instead, “all preemption arguments,” no matter the form they take, “must be grounded” in the text of federal law—usually the text of a “stat- ute.” Kansas , 589 U.S. at 208 (quotation omitted). As a result, preemp- tion analysis almost always turns on statutory interpretation. Va. Ura- nium, Inc. , 587 U.S. at 767 (Gorsuch, J., op.). And courts apply standard
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