Case: 25-7831, 03/10/2026, DktEntry: 81.1, Page 29 of 43
declares that “Congress did not carve out a role for” the States in this area. Id. at 13. Thus, in the CFTC’s view, the States possess no “concur- rent jurisdiction.” Id. These words leave no mystery: the CFTC seeks to be crowned this country’s “sole lawful regulator” of sports betting. See CFTC Br.23 n.14 (quotation omitted). Candidly, “Congress would not have delegated” such “‘highly consequential power’ through ambiguous language.” See Learning Res., Inc. , 2026 WL 477534, at *7 (Roberts, C.J., op.) (quoting West Virginia , 597 U.S. at 723–24). Because this case implicates the major-questions doctrine, the CFTC’s position works only if federal statutes contain a clear statement bestow- ing such grand authority. See West Virginia , 597 U.S. at 724. The CFTC identifies no such clear statement. Instead, like the litigants it supports, the CFTC relies upon a roundabout preemption theory under which Con- gress—fifteen years ago, when sports betting was mostly illegal—suppos- edly made a subtle-but-drastic change to gambling laws by inserting the word “swaps” into a pre-existing regulatory scheme aimed at financial regulation. If that sounds wrong, it is because it is. B. The CFTC’s contrary arguments fall flat. The CFTC no doubt ap- preciates that sports betting is a politically and economically significant
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