Case: 25-7187, 03/10/2026, DktEntry: 75.1, Page 32 of 43
and large, held ‘the regulation of gambling lies at the heart of the state’s police power.’” (quoting Helton v. Hunt , 330 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2003))). As the Supreme Court noted in Murphy , Congress has long structured federal criminal law to “respect the policy choices of the people of each State on the controversial issue of gambling.” 584 U.S. at 484; see also Chicken Ranch , 42 F.4th at 1032 (explaining that IGRA “strike[s] a delicate balance” between tribal and state sovereignty over gaming). And even when Congress chose to prohibit sports betting nationally, it did so through state regulation, rather than by directly regulating private actors. See Murphy , 584 U.S. at 484–85. Similarly, courts have long recognized tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to regulate gaming on their lands. See Cabazon , 480 U.S. at 207–14. Though it imposes limited restrictions on this authority, IGRA still broadly advances tribes’ “exclusive right to regulate [and offer] gaming activity” (including sports betting) on their Indian lands as a means of promoting tribal economic development and self-determination. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(5), 2702(2); W. Flagler , 71 F.4th at 1062–63. And later-enacted statutes of general applicability—like the CEA— cannot repeal earlier-enacted legislation that is specifically designed to advance the United States’ special relationship with tribes—like IGRA—without a clear statement from Congress. See, e.g. , Mancari , 417 U.S. at 550–51.
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