Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 34-1 Filed: 11/14/25 Page: 14 of 22 PAGEID #: 532
(1936). The Indian canons of construction 8 also require courts to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of tribes. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty. , 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Atty. W. Div. of Michigan , 369 F.3d 960, 971 (6th Cir. 2004). Here, Congress did not express the requisite intent for implied repeal. If the Court accepts Kalshi’s position that its sports-event contracts—which constitute sports betting and Class III gaming under IGRA—are swaps subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, then it must also accept the underlying assumption that Congress intended to upend the entire federal framework for Indian gaming and repeal key provisions of IGRA. See, e.g. , 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Additionally, IGRA’s criminal provisions provide the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) with “exclusive jurisdiction” over criminal prosecutions of applicable gambling laws in Indian country, unless a tribe agrees to transfer jurisdiction to the state. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d). Under Kalshi’s theory, the CEA likewise impliedly repealed DOJ’s jurisdiction over such criminal prosecutions (which it did not) because it is impossible for the CFTC to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over sports-event contracts while the DOJ exercises its exclusive jurisdiction over IGRA-related gaming prosecutions. Further, the CEA explicitly disclaims the
8 As Justice Blackmun has explained:
Because Congress’ authority to legislate unilaterally on behalf of the Indians derives from the presumption that Congress will act with benevolence, courts “have developed canons of construction that treaties and other federal action should when possible be read as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favorable to Indians.” Hagen v. Utah , 510 U.S. 399, 442 n.1 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221 (1982 ed.)).
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