Case 1:25-cv-12578-RGS Document 1 Filed 09/15/25 Page 19 of 28
Talmadge). Congress therefore could not have intended States to regulate futures trading in
parallel with the CFTC.
50.
The regulatory scheme set out in the CEA, over which the CFTC has
exclusive jurisdiction, is comprehensive as it relates to designated and registered entities, and the
existence of this comprehensive scheme further evinces Congressional intent to preempt the field
and foreclose parallel state regulation. See Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)
(comprehensive statutory framework led to the conclusion that “the Federal Government has
occupied the field” in the relevant area); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC , 476 U.S. 355, 368-69
(1986) (“Pre-emption occurs . . . where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying
an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law . . . .”).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the CEA establishes “a comprehensive regulatory
structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran , 456 U.S. 353, 356 (1982) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, at 1
(1974)).
51.
Accordingly, the CEA, as amended in 1974 to give the CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction and in 2010 to add swaps and the special rule regarding event contracts, expressly or
impliedly preempts the field of commodity futures and swaps trading, including event contracts
trading, on designated contract markets.
52.
In addition to express or implied field preemption, conflict preemption
exists here with respect to the determination of which event contracts are permitted on CFTC-
designated exchanges. As noted above, the special rule relating to CFTC review of event
contracts vests the CFTC with the power to approve or prohibit certain event contracts. 7 U.S.C.
§ 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i); 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a)(1)-(2). If Massachusetts or the Massachusetts Gaming
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