Volume V (2022) (2015)
Figure 1. The ordinary object perdures 21
Considering identity as a perduring entity depends on a scientific view of time, called
eternalism, which suggests that objects from both the past and the future exist.
According to eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things. 22
Just like how New York City and Tokyo exist at the same time but in different spatial locations,
this view argues that the future and past exist in the same spatial location but in different times. If
the future and past do not exist (are not real), then identity cannot have temporal parts.
In addition, this view of time does not privilege the present moment and the present
“identity” of a person. Seeing identity as a perduring entity means that a person is not fully present
at a given moment in time. Personal identity at a given time t is only a partial manifestation of a whole extended throughout time. This understanding of identity makes it possible for Tim at t 1 and Tim at t 2 to both be Tim. The only difference would be that Tim at t 1 and Tim at t 2 are partial
manifestations of the identity 'Tim.' Similar to how an ear, a nose, an arm, or a leg, are not the
whole body but parts of the body, Tim’s temporal parts are not Tim’s identity but parts of Tim’s
identity.
21 Sean Enda Power, “Change and Persistence,” in Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 2021), 79. 22 Nina Emery, Ned Markosian, and Meghan Sullivan, “Time,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, November 24, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/.
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