Volume V (2022) (2015)
experience and temporal objects therein by “retaining” and “pretending” the elapsed and yet-to-come phases of its experience and thereby the past words that do not presently exist. 24
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the binding entity itself must have the ability to “ flow
through time ” or “ extend through time. ” As long as a binding entity can transcend bodily death,
reincarnation is possible.
Influential theories of personal identity proposed by David Armstrong, David Lewis, Robert
Nozick, Derek Parfit, and Sydney Shoemaker suggest that "personal identity through time
necessarily involves causal continuity but does not necessarily involve continuity of the same body or of the same brain." 25 In other words, causal continuity, the binding entity necessary for personal
identity, does not necessarily require a particular body or brain's continued existence. Casual
continuity can be explained as the continuation of an entity through time because of a causal
connection. For example, causal continuation happens when a person remembers something they
did yesterday or where their previous intention persists and today gives rise to an action. In other
words, it is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness where there is sufficient connectedness to justify the claim that X and Y are the same people. 26 For this paper's argument, it
is not essential to explain the criteria for a "strong connectedness" that causes causal continuity
between a person with different bodies at different times — as long as causal continuance is
possible, reincarnation is possible. Not addressing this problem does not weaken the argument that
identity is not limited to the present and can possibly transcend death, manifesting itself in different
times and bodies.
As mentioned in the introduction, the paper does not plan to prove the truth of reincarnation
but attempts to demonstrate that it is possible given the ontology of identity, while at the same time
proving the advantage of this view over the constitutional view of resurrection proposed by Baker.
Reincarnation does not have the same stringent demands that Baker has in terms of unchanging
first-person perspective that is not impacted by bodily constitution. Reincarnation is possible as
long as a binding entity is present whether it be first-person perspective or causal continuity.
In conclusion, there are two significant problems with Baker’s account of the constitution
view: it assumes that personal identity is independent of the body and that personal identity
24 Michael Kelly, “Phenomenology and Time - Consciousness,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , https://iep.utm.edu/phe-time/. 25 Robert Elliot, “Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement,” The Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 162 (January 1, 1991): pp. 55-75, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219786. 26 Elliot, 55.
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