Volume V (2022) (2015)
which is why they added WF. This move highlights why I find reliabilism more plausible than
evidentialism. Feldman and Conee assert that one’s belief must be based on the evidence in order
to be justified. In line with what I argued earlier, I find that it is the act of basing the belief on the
evidence, not the evidence itself , that holds the justifying power. I take evidence to be the input,
and the processes that make a fitting belief holds the justifying power.
I proposed this question earlier rhetorically, but I wish to return to it more seriously; what
makes a belief fit the evidence? What explains the fitting relationship between evidence and belief?
The problem with this formation of the question is that it is easy to assume there is a relationship
between evidence and belief independent of the belief-holder. The relationship between the belief
and the evidence is not independent of, nor prior to, the belief- holder’s forming the belief, but
rather, the belief-holder creates the relationship between them when they form a belief based on
that evidence. In other words, the belief-holder actively fits the belief to match the evidence. It is
this active participation on the part of the belief-holder that I feel reliabilism better captures than
evidentialism.
I still have not answered the question; what makes a belief fit the evidence? This is where I
am unclear on the evidentialist position. To Feldman and Conee’s credit, they noted that they were not concerned about answering this question for the purposes of their paper. 12 For the purposes of
this paper, however, I am concerned with this question. As I have mentioned, I assume many
evidentialists have answers to the question. I would like to propose my own answer, from a
reliabilist standpoint; a belief fits the evidence if the process used to fit it reliably leads to true
beliefs. In truth, I have difficulty imagining what else someone would want out of a notion of
fitting evidence. When someone assesses their evidence in order to form a belief, I assume their
goal is to come to a true belief. In a sense, they are trying to estimate what the truth is based on the
evidence they have. Fitting beliefs to evidence is a means to the end that is having true beliefs.
How well it fits is best measured by how well that end is achieved, and how well that end is
achieved is best measured using reliability. In this sense, reliabilism directly accounts for the
purpose of the endeavor; to obtain true beliefs and avoid false ones. I cannot say with confidence
that this explanation is stronger than existing evidentialist explanations since I am not familiar with
them; I would be interested to see what an alternate explanation could offer that is preferable. I am,
however, confident that this explanation works well, given the rest of the view.
12 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 32.
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