Volume V (2022) (2015)
IV. Conclusion
I find reliabilism to be more plausible than evidentialism. However, many accounts of
reliabilism do not take evidence seriously enough. This led me to propose that a “reliable belief -
making process” be limited to those processes that use eviden ce or existing justified beliefs as
inputs. I also proposed that reliabilism can allow for multiple reliable processes per belief. My
adjustments to reliabilism can account for the importance of evidence while maintaining that it is
the processes by which one uses their evidence to form a belief that ultimately determines the
justifiedness of the belief. They also allowed reliabilism to stand up better to Feldman and Conee’s
objections to the view, and ultimately were able to show reliabilism can do everything their
account of evidentialism can. I hope that I have not merely taken reliabilism and made it so similar
to evidentialism that the distinction is merely semantical, and I hope instead that I was able to
convey why I find the distinction so compelling.
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