Volume V (2022) (2015)
The Ontology of Identity and Possibility of Reincarnation
Tenzin Tsundu Marist College
Abstract
This paper argues that reincarnation is metaphysically possible and provides a more reasonable account of existence after bodily death than the account of resurrection proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker. The paper investigates Baker’s conditions for resurrection and criticisms of it rendered by Andrei A. Buckareff and Joel S. Van Wagenen. The paper claims that understanding identity as a perduring entity rather than an enduring entity makes the account of reincarnation more coherent and protects it from proposed criticisms. This perduring view of identity corresponds congruently with the scientific view of time and maps better with an individual’s lived experience. This paper extends the discussion on the metaphysics of reincarnation, demonstrating its dependency on the nature of individual identity.
Reincarnation has been a core belief in many religions for millennia. However, today, many
people believe this concept to be nothing more than a myth invented to fulfill people’s most
primitive desire to transcend death. This paper will investigate the idea of reincarnation,
establishing that the very nature of “identity” makes reincarnation metaphysically possible. Firstly,
the paper examines previously proposed concepts of reincarnation or related concepts, such as
resurrection, to identify their shortcomings and introduce a new concept of reincarnation,
improving upon the previously proposed concepts. Specifically, this paper examines the
constitution view of the resurrection process proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker and investigates
criticisms of it rendered by Buckareff and Wagenen. In doing so, this paper proposes that Baker’s
claim that a person — their first-person perspective — remains the same throughout their lifetime and after the resurrection is not accurate. 1 Instead, this paper argues that a person — their personal
identity — is not an enduring entity, i.e., an entity that does not change and is wholly present
1 Andrei A. Buckareff and Joel S. Van Wagenen, “Surviving Resurrection,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67, no. 3 (2009): 138, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0.
3
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