Volume V (2022) (2015)
the miracle condition deals with divine intervention. 11
The two latter conditions, embodiment and miracle conditions, are reasonable if Christian
theology is accepted. However, the first condition requires considerable evidence, outside of
divinity, to explain the continuity of the first-person perspective, i.e., how it remains the same
throughout an individual’s life. I n their critique of Baker’s constitutional view, Buckareff and
Wagenen point out that it is not evident that these three conditions provide an adequate theory of resurrection. 12 Nonetheless, this theory of conditions provides a framework to understand the
criteria by which persistence of identity after the body’s death is possible. It also provides a
foundation for future theories of resurrection and reincarnation to build upon and improve.
Baker suggests “sameness of the first -person perspective allows one to survive a complete change of body, including brain.” 13 Therefore, for her, A at t 1 and B at t 2 are the same person if and only if A and B have the same first-person perspective. 14 She claims that:
(T) For all objects, x and y and times t and t I , if x is a human person at t and y is a human person at t 1 , then x = y if and only if for all human bodies, z, w, necessarily: (z constitutes x at t if and only if z constitutes y at t ) and (w constitutes x at t I if and only if w constitutes y at t 1 ). 15
The above equation means that two bodies at different times can be said to have been constituted
by the same person if and only if they share the same first- person perspective. Baker’s description
of the sameness of personal identity depends on whether the persons share the same first-person
perspective. In addition, her argument about personal identity assumes that: (i) personal identity is
independent of the body and (ii) personal identity is an enduring entity.
Buckareff and Wagenen argue against the notion that personal identity or Baker's account of the first-person perspective is independent of the body by using several thought experiments. 16
For example, they consider the following:
Charles is a fully functioning human adult. Unfortunately, Charles's doctor tells Charles that he is terminally ill. But, he can avoid it by getting transferred to another donor's body. His previous body will be destroyed, but his first-person perspective will be preserved throughout the transfer. Thus, he will identify his last body as having constituted him before the procedure and regard his new body as
11 Baker, 340. 12 Buckareff and Wagenen, 125. 13 Baker, “Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View,” 125. 14 Buckareff and Wagenen, 126. 15 Baker, 139.
16 They use five cases of thought experiments. All the cases come to the same conclusion stated above and provide a similar thought process. Therefore, this paper did not consider it necessary to give more than one example to understand their critique.
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