3'(+#"2*4,.%6+#24%&4#$( ! A deliberate strategic choice is implied here, which is to work from the premise that the Freudian conceptual body is still the fertile ground from which post-Freudian concepts grow. While these may employ a different vocabulary, it begs the question whether the introduction of a new term truly reflects the introduction of a new concept and is not a mere rebranding. A parsimony principle, attributable to William of Ockham (Fourteenth Century), but also to William James’ philosophical pragmatism, is necessary in this domain.The rule is that new concepts should be introduced only if they cover new ground by referring to some unique fact or process not already invoked by existing notions. In the physical sciences this rule is more easily obeyed than in our field since, in psychoanalysis, we lack the “crucial experiment” that demonstrates—or disconfirms—the actual uniqueness of the concept, let alone the existence of the concept’s referent. The easiness with which new ideas and expressions are brought to our attention in psychoanalysis certainly reflects the liveliness of the field, but it can also become problematic when expressions and ideas do not really add to our actual knowledge but simply reformulate older ideas in a new guise. Then again, this could still be a minor problem, were it not that such strategy—even when it is not intentional—results in a lack of genuine discussion among psychoanalysts and in the creation of ever more divergent theories and “schools” within psychoanalysis. One example could be the use of “dissociation” as a replacement for “repression” by a number of contemporary authors. In a research conducted by one of my students (paper in preparation), a close examination of the history of the two concepts, and more importantly of their past and present usage, shows that it is in fact quite difficult to set them apart, especially when both are looked at as process or mechanism. A close reading of Freud and Janet, for instance, shows how the two concepts, though different in some respect, are not really as different as modern theoreticians say they are. If a well documented conceptual debate could be carried around these two concepts, it could possibly diminish the theoretical distance between different “schools”. ;.%&(#-*+"%/+-'(.24(* ! Not surprisingly, the close study of any psychoanalytic concept immediately raises issues about other concepts belonging to the same conceptual cluster—think here, for example, of the cluster formed by primal and secondary repression, splitting (of the Ego, of the object), dissociation, suppression, denial, disavowal, negation etc.—so that conceptual research is, in a way, always examining the theory as a whole. Therefore, what Laplanche had identified in Freud’s theorizing (that change in one par of the theory requires change in another part) remains true when we engage in research concerning contemporary issues. Thus, for instance, if there is indeed an —albeit partial—overlap between repression and dissociation, then we may wish to look for some underlying, more “primitive” formulation that could account for the clinical phenomena encompassed by the two concepts. This, in turn, may question other large areas or clusters within the theory as a whole. For instance, one could ask how the more basic concept or “common denominator” behind dissociation and repression resonates with other common denominators in the remaining conceptual clusters, and so on. Lacking, as we saw, the “crucial experiment” and being observer-dependent, psychoanalytic practice cannot be expected to demonstrate the validity of its concepts in the way, for instance, the Large Hadron Collider recently confirmed the existence of the Higgs Boson. Our concepts and theories are supported by their potential refutability, their internal coherence, their compatibility with other concepts within existing conceptual clusters, their heuristic value and clinical usefulness. Indirect support can also be provided by their eventual resonance with concepts belonging to the neighbouring social and biological sciences. The task is therefore to identify the concepts and theories that seem to rest on more shaky grounds and submit them to the test of seeing if and how much they meet the above mentioned criteria. In this way, conceptual research constantly“puts to the question” psychoanalytic theory as a whole and may thus ensure its vitality, its closer correspondence to the facts unearthed by psychoanalytic practice and its unique contribution, alongside other disciplines, to the task of understanding the human condition.
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