'#"L#%((&)+&:(A?-"B"LA&
About the same time as the revolution began in the brain sciences, psychology underwent a radical transformation, moving it from the periphery of the study of the mind to its current position as the recognised leader in the scientific study of mental processes (Westen, 1999). The chief driving forces behind these changes were: The elaboration of the computer metaphor for psychological processes and the use of computer modelling for testing the appropriateness of psychological theories (e.g. Schmajuk, Lamoureux, & Holland, 1998). The harnessing of technology for improved quality of observation, including the ready availability of video recordings, improved physiological measurements, endocrine and genetic analysis (e.g. Plomin et al., 1997). More sophisticated methods of data analysis including techniques for causal analysis and special methods for analysing large data sets (McClelland, 1997). Recognising the limitations of their early attempts at psychological intervention, clinical psychologists have worked hard to provide adequate psychological treatments, rarely seeing themselves in opposition to other treatment approaches, but rather as adjuncts bridging the gaps which cheaper pharmacological treatments left behind (Salzman, 1998; Thase, 1997). By contrast to the attitude of psychoanalysts, psychologists embraced and built upon developments in related fields and have undertaken many significant large-scale collaborative investigations (e.g. Offord et al., 1992; Rutter, Tizard, & Whitmore, 1981). 4M(,@?B%(&,"&)+,%L#@,)"+& The problems created by the combination of psychoanalytic prejudice against non-medical disciplines in general and psychology in particular have grown over the years. One aspect of the problem is the voluntary abandonment by psychoanalysis of opportunities for major contributions to the behavioural sciences. A good instance of this is the controversy concerning developmental studies referred to by Roger Perron (2001). The attempt to reduce psychoanalytic developmental work to a mere metaphor flies in the face of Freud’s intentions as indicated by his own observational studies (see Freud, 1909a; 1919; 1920) as well as the work of some of the most distinguished psychoanalytic clinicians including Anna Freud, Renee Spitz, Margaret Mahler, Esther Bick, Donald Winnicott – all of whom saw value in observing the young child, particularly in interaction with a caregiver. These efforts have been meaningful sources of inspiration to theory building and to draw a sharp line between observational studies and psychoanalytic theory as a matter of principle at this particular time seems arbitrary, unscientific and counter-productive. There is no discernible rationale except apparent incompatibilities between the psychoanalytic theories arising out of psychoanalytic observation and those cherished by certain theoreticians. To suddenly rule out observations because these no longer fit in with preconception is certainly not what Freud taught us about science. The scientific developmental model has never been metaphorical – nor has it ever been closer to empirical validation (see, for example, Westen, 1998). For example, while Anna Freud and Glover criticised Klein for the extravagant developmental claims implied by her theory, more recent observational evidence is by and large consistent with her claims – certainly those in terms of the cognitive capacities of the human infant (Gergely, 1991). There is an even more problematic area concerning psychological therapies where the isolationist attitude of psychoanalysts has undoubtedly created a long-term problem. The pressure for cheaper, more cost-effective therapies has prompted some psychoanalytic clinicians to experiment with alternative methods of treatment – briefer, more focussed therapies, special therapies for particular groups (e.g. Malan & Osimo, 1992; Sifneos, 1992). These experiments were, on the whole, poorly
4'20&&;443&&32D.2E&&F&&19.3;&&2;.1.40&&GHIJ&&F& VC
Made with FlippingBook HTML5