German artillery fire was so devastating that their infantry had captured the French lines
earlier than Falkenhayn’s strategy demanded. 30 Consequently, German tactical success
began to deny their strategic success. 31
When looking at the Brusilov Offensive of 1916, Russian strategic aims seemed not to
have changed much compared to their East Prussian invasion of 1914; their intention was
still to relieve their Western allies of German focus by launching offensives into Austro-
Hungarian and German lines. 32 The Austro-Germans were confident in their defensive
capabilities, and in contrast to their tactical doctrine in 1914, seemed uninclined to take the
offensive. This was mostly due to the belief that they thought Russia incapable of mounting
a major offensive at this time. 33 Thus, there would be no need to take the initiative.
Brus ilov’s masterpiece began with consistent periodic bombardment of Austro -
Hungarian lines, but followed without infantry assault. 34 After doing so to the point that the
Austro-Hungarians were despondent in manning their defences, Russian infantry was sent to
assault the demolished positions. 35 The use of heavy artillery in destroying defensive
positions was not novel, and in fact on the Western Front had become obsolescent. In 1914,
the typical Russian infantry division had only 6 batteries of artillery. 36 By 1916, the number
of heavy guns available had increased significantly, and further benefitting the Russians, the
30 Neiberg, p.164-165. 31 Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, p.61-63. 32 Timothy C. Dowling, The Brusilov Offensive (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) p. XV 33 Simkins, Jukes, & Hickey, p. 218 34 Dowling, p. 67-72 35 Dowling, p. 72-73 36 Nikolai Golovin , ‘The Russian War Plan of 1914’, The Slavonic and East European Review, 14. 42 (1936), 564- 584 (p. 565)
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