Gorffennol Volume 7 (2023)

Germans had apparently seen fit to ‘diminish’ their own on the Eastern Front in light of

Russian disorganisation. 37

With this new advantage, Brusilov was thus able to utilise his batteries to greater

effect than in the previous years of the war. Unconventional of Russian methods, Brusilov

did not concentrate his offensive into a ‘main thrust’, but spread his resources relatively

evenly across the four armies at his disposal. 38 Brusilov’s offensive, as noted by Pavlov, was a

‘subsidiary’ to the main Russian operation north of his theatre. As such, the Austro -

Hungarians were not met with the expected signs of Russian preparation for assault. 39

Brusilov’s use of artillery and deceptive methods of assault should indicate a shift in the

tactical acumen of Russian warfare, but it seemed to be a predominantly individual effort

rather than encompassing Stavka or his peers. His tactics were still infantry-heavy, much due

to the means available.

As noted by Shimshoni, the failed plans and great battles of the War showcase the

extent of how destructive war can be when the potency of the technology at play is not

heeded correctly. 40 Thus, the War was to influence the usage of available resources, shifting

the emphasis on a superhuman expectation of the infantrymen to emphasis on the

destructive and tactical power purported by artillery, especially heavy artillery. The failure of

the belligerents’ in 1914 did not const itute a shift in their strategic aims, but the next two

years of warfare incited tactical reforms necessitated by the reasons for the strategies’

37 Nikolai Golovin , ‘Brusilov’s Offensive: The Galician Battle of 1916’, The Slavonic and East European Review , 13. 39 (1935), 571-596 (p.572) 38 Andrey Pavlov, ‘Russian Artillery’, in King of Battle: Artillery in World War 1, Ed. by Sanders Marble (Leiden: BRILL, 2015), pp. 255-280 (p.255-269) 39 Pavlov, p. 269 40 Jonathan Shimshoni , ‘Technology, Military Advantage and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship’, International Security, 15. 3 (1991), 187-215 (pp.188-189)

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