July, 1940
T H E K I N G ’ S B U S I N E S S Significance of the News By DAN GILBERT Washington, D. C , and San Diego, California
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constant characteristic of Communist policy has been its inconstancy. The Reds have reversed themselves a&aia and again, with respect to their domes tic as well as their foreign policy. On his record of past performance, there would be no reason to suppose that Stalin would stay “tied” to the Nazi war chariot, if there were any real advantage in breaking loose. As previously indicated in this col umn, Stalin engineered the Nazi-Soviet pact in the beginning, on the presump- ton that Communism had everything to gain and nothing to lose from the de struction of the other nations of Europe- Many observers felt, from the start, that Stalin was counting on the early collapse and defeat of Germany. This would enable Soviet Russia to take over the German nation and bring her under the complete dominance of Moscow. The smashing of the German army on the west would give Russia her opportunity to move in on the east. The view as sumed that Stalin’s purpose In egging Hitler on to war was to secure the ad vance of' Sovietism at the expense of Germany. Frank L. Kluckhohn, foreign expert of the New York Times, thinks that the last thing Stalin wanted was a Nazi triumph, and that the present prospect of it appalls him: “Reports from Moscow speak of something approaching panic on the part of the Soviet rulers. . . . To put it bluntly, the diplomatic reports indicate that they are shaking in their boots and fully realize ¿hat a Germany dominating all of Europe would have Russia at its mercy. These reports indicate that the offi cials of the Kremlin have been shocked by the speed and success to this point of the Nazi drive through the Low Countries and into France.” According to this observer, “Joseph Stalin thought that, in playing his part in assuring that the Nazi attack would he in the west and not the east, he could count on a long war in which both sides would emerge exhausted. He planned to toss his weight first on one side and then another to assure this.” A long war which would seriously weaken both sides would enable Stalin to emerge as the real dictator of Europe. Mr. Kluckhohn continues, “Information in reliable quarters is to the effect that the internal sit uation in Russia is far from good from the viewpoint of its leaders and that the Soviet Union is not strong enough to step in at this moment when an Allied defeat is regarded in Moscow as at least pos- [Continued on Page 256]
herself to Mussolini’s pro-Nazi attitude, a renewed effort to win Stalin away from Hitler was launched. In view of past failures of all such attempts, in view of Stalin’s deliberate “sell-outs” at every opportunity in the past, it is difficult to understand the basis on which hopes are still enter tained that the Nazi-Soviet pact can be wrenched. Upon assumption of power, Winston Churchill’s government began to seek for a new and more friendly approach to improvement of relations with Rus sia. The Associated Press carried this ex planation: “Inclusion of the Labor and Lib eral Parties in the cabinet was said to have paved the way for abandon ment of the stiff-necked attitude of former Prime Minister Chamberlain and most of his Conservative re gime toward the U. S. S. R. “A softening of press attacks al ready has been noted. . . . Discus sions between Russian Ambassador Maisky and Foreign Secretary Hali fax are intended to open the way for trade negotiations on a broader basis, and ultimately lead to im provement of political relations.” STALIN’S SHIFTINESS: • It well may be that the hope for a “shift” in Soviet policy is predicated on the notorious “shiftiness” of Stalin’s character. Under his leadership, the one
ANTI-GOD COMBINE: • Nothing demonstrates so vividly the inherently atheistic character of the Nazi movement as the efficiency with which it cooperates with Soviet Com munism in the advancement of the cause of international godlessness. Per sonal and political differences between Hitler and Stalin have made other phases of the Soviet-Nazi pact operate rather unsmoothly. But in the “fight against religion” there is perfect har mony, both theoretically and practically, between the two movements. I Russia, the most vocal and vehe ment praise for Nazism issues from the organs devoted exclusively to atheist propaganda. The “militant godless” wing of the Communist Party supports Hitler with far more enthusiasm than do other sections of the Communist In ternational. On the occasion ty! Hitler's invasion of Holland and Belgium, the Soviet press assumed an attitude of coolness and even mild criticism. It probably was an insincere gesture, but it is significant that Bezbozhnik, offi cial Moscow organ of Soviet atheists, broke away from the “Communist Party line” and intensified its praise of Hitler aggression at the very time that other Moscow organs were veering in the other direction. Bezbozhnik branded as “ traitors to Communism" all who would oppose or impede a united effort for world domi nance on the part of the forces of Hit lerism and Stalinism: “Whoever opposes Soviet-German cooperation is an enemy of the Soviet government and of Commun ism. Germany and the Soviet are unitedly fighting against capitalism, against religion, and for a new so cial order. The German nation, like the Soviet people, are against re ligion and for socialism . . . Stalin and Hitler are against religion and capitalism.” SOVIET SPHINX: • For reasons which do not appear clear to us, influential Allied leaders still seem to regard Soviet Russia as an “unknown factor,” or at least an “unde termined factor,” in the European equa tion. The “pulling and hauling,” the “coaxing and teasing,” the diplomatic “wooing” of Russia continues. At the very time that Britain apparently gave up the “wooing” of Italy and reconciled
Cartoon by Bruce Bussell, Courtesy, TJhe Los Angeles Times.
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