ing crises, thus reinforcing unity and resolve towards China and other adversaries. China dominates the process- ing of rare earths and other critical minerals vital for military and advanced technologies such as sem- iconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. It has already banned exports of antimony, germanium and gallium in retalia-
tion against US tariffs. During his first term, Trump identified this as a national security threat. At Kananaskis, he could spearhead a coordinated strategy to expand G7 investment in exploration, mining and processing to reduce depend- ence on China and to secure G7 and others’ supply chains. On defence, Canada, Italy and Japan remain below the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s benchmark of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defence. Canada and Italy will face renewed pressure at the NATO summit from 24–26 June in The Hague. The G7 meeting on 15–17 June allows the US to reinforce the importance of increased spending by all allies, including non-NATO members such as Japan. As for energy, Trump’s execu- tive order on 20 January to expand American energy production could be complemented by support for Canadian energy exports. Although most Canadian oil and gas cur- rently flows to the US, Japan and several European G7 countries have expressed interest in import- ing liquefied natural gas, oil and nuclear fuel from Canada. Inade- quate infrastructure has hindered exports to these markets. Trump’s 10% tariff on Canadian energy to the US could incentivise diversification. At Kananaskis, the G7 could launch joint efforts to develop Canadian export capacity, expanding global energy security. Immigration has long been a Trump priority. With over 140 mil- lion stateless and displaced people worldwide, G7 members are revis- iting their immigration policies. Canada is facing record-low public support for immigration. The US could lead efforts to forge a G7 con- sensus that emphasizes coordinated
screening, orderly migration and repatriation as standard practice. ADAPTIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES The US has led globally in using economic sanctions to deter adver- saries. Yet without coordination, bad actors exploit loopholes by rerouting goods, funds or personnel through non-participating coun- tries. At Kananaskis, the US could push for stronger G7 alignment on sanctions, including enforce- ment and compliance. This would tighten pressure on China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, and perhaps temper divergent approaches – such as recent European calls to sanc- tion Israel. New US tariffs announced since 20 January have jolted global mar- kets. However, Trump’s targeted tariffs on China have found support among G7 partners. Recent moves to lift tariffs on goods that meet the origin rules set out in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement demonstrate the Trump admin- istration’s continued support for negotiated trade deals. The UK, the EU and Japan have each pursued bilateral deals with Washington, but with limited success. Reviving these talks could lay the groundwork for a broader agreement – a potential ‘Trump Round’ to reform the World Trade Organization, which stalled after the Doha Round’s collapse in 2017. Across each of these agenda items, meaningful progress requires US initiative. The Trump adminis- tration could use the Kananaskis Summit to align global partners on national security and economic goals, paving the way for concrete achievements. This groundwork could culminate in 2027, when the United States hosts the G7 once again.
// CHRISTOPHER SANDS Christopher Sands is director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC.
119 globalgovernanceproject.org
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