// MILITARY SECURITY: RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND EUROPE
and military intelligence contributions. Yet President Trump, who immediately after assuming office returned Churchill’s bust to the Oval Office, is seemingly pur- suing neo-isolationist policies that risk mimicking those of Neville Chamberlain. Trump’s stratagems seem to be a micro- cosm of overall global disruption and unpredictability. UKRAINE IS CRITICAL TO GLOBAL STABILITY The good news is that, whether by domes- tic design or under extreme pressure from the US, most North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries have reached or surpassed the minimum 2% of gross domestic product expenditure on defence. Key European countries, including France, Germany and the United King- dom, recognise Ukraine’s central role, not only in European but also in global secu- rity, and the growing danger posed by a relentlessly aggressive Putin regime. Poland is doubling its defence expendi- tures and armed forces, and Germany and France are moving in that direction. Japan, the sole non-NATO G7 member, is also significantly boosting its defence expenditures and self-defence forces. Unfortunately, these impressive efforts take time to bear fruit. The Europeans have allowed their military forces and defence industries to atrophy to a level where Russia, with an economy below one tenth that of the combined G7 but with many years of immense military expendi- tures, poses a threat that is difficult to counter. The Europeans should thus vastly scale up the whole spectrum of their defence. NATO will need to rely on the US in the short term for some of the most advanced weapons, logistics and intelli- gence inputs. Consequently, old NATO aphorisms about keeping the US in and the Russians out still resonate. Yet this should not just be a simple repetition of Cold War strat- egy, since the US is not likely to make the same level of contribution and Russia is not a superpower except for nuclear weap- ons, is not governed by a universalistic doctrine and is but an aggressive remnant of the Soviet empire. Furthermore, despite heroic attempts to find elegant explana- tions for Vladimir Putin’s regime, he is more mafia than Machiavelli. CONSTRUCTIVE CONTAINMENT One central challenge, therefore, is to ‘right size’ Russia. The threat is real, but Russia is not unstoppable. By 1975, after
“With western help, Ukraine can defend itself, and become a thriving, prosperous democracy. This would set the most powerful example to the Russian people of the possibility of Slavic states becoming true winners”
30 years, Germany, Italy and Japan – the Axis powers of 1945 defeated by the west – were successful democracies with vibrant internationally competitive economies. Contrast that with a post- 1991 Russia, 30-plus years later, where, with the exception of the oligarchs (and Putin himself), the overwhelm- ing majority of its people are poorer than even Romanian or Turkish citi- zens, inhabiting an energy-dependent, largely un-modernised, uncompetitive economy wracked by rampant corrosive corruption. Since Putin is not prepared to address the fundamental economic and political issues that would threaten his power, he has become dependent on external crises, real or manufactured, to divert popular attention away from those fundamental domestic problems and play on the worst instincts of the Russian people – fear of chaos and his- torical xenophobia. Possibilities for constructive engage- ment with Russia are limited. Trump’s vision of a grand agreement with Russia where it switches from partnering with China to the US is a perilous delu- sion. What is realistic is a new form of containment with Ukraine kept safe, Russian aggression stopped – at the very least no further than today’s lines – and the remaining 80% of Ukraine becomes viable. With western help, Ukraine can defend itself, and become a thriving, prosperous democracy. This would set the most powerful example to the Rus- sian people of the possibility of Slavic states becoming true winners, like dem- ocratic Japan, Germany and Italy. Such new containment, however, can only succeed if G7 leaders mobilise national capacity, make their economies more resilient, expeditiously escalate their defence capabilities and commit to safeguarding Ukraine. Moreover, they must persuade Trump that this is the best way for the US to be great and secure, and win together with the other members and, ultimately, with the rest of the world, including the long-suffering Russian people who deserve to see a far better post-Putin future.
// AUREL BRAUN Aurel Braun is a professor of international relations and polit- ical science, and a fellow of Trinity College at the Univer- sity of Toronto. He is also an associate of the Davis Center at Harvard. His latest book is NATO-Russia Relations in the 21st Century , and his forthcom- ing book is on Russia, the west and Arctic security.
28 // G7 CANADA: THE KANANASKIS SUMMIT 2025
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