Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
China’s Confucius Institutes are central to its information strategy in Africa with about 60 operating in 49 African countries. Although they promote Chinese language and culture, the institutes also openly serve Chinese political and economic goals, attracting criticism from both African and Western observers. As one African scholar noted, “They interfere with the academic freedom within universities and indoctrinate students with Chinese political systems that could be seen as authoritarian or undemocratic.” Unsurprisingly, the growth of Confucius Institutes has corresponded with a growth in the number of African students attending Chinese universities, which has risen from less than 2,000 in 2003 to over 81,500 in 2018. [46] [47] The framework for China’s security presence in Africa is the GSI, which seeks to o er an alternative model of security to that o ered by the US and the West, and to address causes of insecurity that threaten China’s economic interests. The Chinese government articulates the goals of the GSI as presenting Beijing as a “dispute arbiter, architect of new regional security frameworks, and trainer of security professionals and police forces in developing countries.” China has become the dominant seller of military equipment to Africa, overtaking Russia, and selling to some 70% of African militaries, with states like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia buying over 90% of their weapons from China. Major items sold include jet trainers, armored personnel carriers, anti-ship missiles, and combat drones. [48] [49] Africa is the location of China’s rst overseas military base, opened in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in 2017, and there have been persistent rumors of another base planned for Equatorial Guinea on Africa’s Atlantic coast. Having bases in both regions would make sense, given China’s integration of its security and economic goals in Africa. Many of its most important BRI projects are in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, both important trade routes but also beset by piracy, terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of mass violence. Of course, a base in Equatorial Guinea could also act as a springboard for greater Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic Ocean, something US policymakers greet with alarm. [50] Like Russia, China has a robust private military and security company (PMSC) presence in Africa. But Chinese and Russian PMSCs operate di erently and have di erent goals. Chinese security rms are generally employed to protect Chinese BRI projects and other investments, and most but not all operate unarmed. With over 10,000 Chinese businesses operating in Africa and some one million Chinese living there, the scale of Beijing’s economic presence—and accompanying security vulnerability—is clear. Estimates suggest that some 3,200 Chinese PMSC personnel operate overseas, with the vast majority of these in Africa: about 2,000 contractors from a single Chinese rm operate in Ethiopia and Kenya alone. The nal two forms of Chinese security presence in Africa are its UN peacekeepers and its police forces. As noted previously, over 80% of Chinese peacekeepers are deployed to Africa, and over 32,000 Chinese soldiers have served in UN missions there, the highest number among permanent members of the UN Security Council. Beijing’s police presence in Africa is less benign, serving largely to keep tabs on Chinese citizens living there, and by agreement with many African countries, to extradite them back to China to face punishment. [53] [51] [52]
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