Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
China’s presence and power in Africa become clear in the use of the economic instrument. By every economic measure, China dwarfs Russia on the continent. Beijing’s engagement is deep, broad, and focused on the long term with massive investments in infrastructure (BRI), huge trade turnover, and signi cant foreign direct investment (FDI). Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the construction and telecoms sectors. China has been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2009, with trade turnover reaching a record $348 billion in 2025. But trade between the two is unbalanced: China generally imports raw materials like crude oil, copper, and cobalt from Africa, and exports nished goods. The trade gures reveal the results of this imbalance, with the continent’s trade de cit with China widening by 64.5% to a record $102 billion in 2025. As they do elsewhere, Chinese imports often compete with locally produced products and drive local manufacturers out of business. [54] [55] [56] [57] Like its trade with Africa, China’s loans and investment there are a double-edged sword. On one hand, Chinese loans and investment have played a crucial role in addressing Africa’s infrastructure de cits through projects like Kenya’s Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway and the Djibouti–Ethiopia Railway, which have enhanced regional connectivity and trade. Chinese loans are often o ered to African countries with few other sources of nancing due to their low credit ratings. To protect these somewhat risky investments, Beijing secures its loans by leveraging natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals to mitigate the risk of default. For example, China has taken oil from Sudan, gold from Tanzania, and copper from Zambia as compensation for unpaid loans. [58] [59] China has not yet seized its Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa, something Western policymakers routinely warn about. Instead, it has acted like other lenders, scaling back its loans to overly debt-burdened clients, extending payment periods, and sometimes lowering interest rates. Debt to China is still a major concern for many African governments. The top ten African debtor countries owe China some $200 billion collectively. Djibouti, despite not being in the top ten in total debt to China, may be the most debt-distressed African state, owing Beijing some 70% of its annual GDP. Finally, China has been criticized for using mostly Chinese labor and for causing environmental damage in Africa. Chinese-operated mines in Africa, for example, have had “detrimental e ects on local ecosystems, including deforestation, soil erosion, and water pollution.” [60] [61] [62]
Conclusion
Russia and China are neither partners nor competitors in Africa. Instead, their interaction there can best be described as compartmentalized: each is aware that the other has interests in Africa and is using a combination of instruments to pursue those interests and build its in uence. Rather than formally cooperate or compete, they generally stay out of each other’s way. Any cooperation that exists is ad hoc, and any competition is limited in scope and has not yet impacted their overall relationship. The two appear to have found an informal division of labor, where China focuses on nances, infrastructure, trade, and technological development, and Russia focuses on arms sales (although China has overtaken it here), regime survival, and parlaying these into what economic gains it can, primarily through resource extraction.
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