Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Introduction
In mid-January 2026, warships from Russia, China, and Iran began converging o the coast of South Africa. Soon joined by ships of the South African Navy, the visitors were in African waters for the naval exercise “Will for Peace 2026.”. Exercises involving the Russian and Chinese navies have become a regular occurrence around Africa. The most recent one was the third since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The meaning of Will for Peace was more broadly geopolitical than narrowly military. Although the otillas were small—with only two Russian and two Chinese ships participating—the signals the exercise sent were signi cant. For Russia, it served to highlight that its military is still respected and welcome in the Global South, and that attempts to isolate it for its attack on Ukraine have limits. For China, increased military presence in and around Africa serves its goal of building stability on the continent, stability required for Beijing’s signi cant economic investments in Africa to bear fruit. For both, the exercise served to demonstrate their blue-water reach and normalize their naval presence along key sea lanes. [1] Military exercises are only one way Russia and China have been advancing their interests and attempting to build in uence in Africa. Both have also used diplomacy and economic engagement to do so. In 2026, for the 36th straight year, the Chinese Foreign Minister’s rst foreign visit of the year was to Africa. Over that period, there have been “almost 200 visits to 48 African countries involving Chinese heads of state, premiers, and foreign ministers.” This year’s visit is to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, and Lesotho. Russia’s diplomatic engagement with Africa lags China’s, but Moscow is working to increase it. In December 2025, it held the second Russia-Africa Ministerial Conference in Egypt, the rst of the series launched in 2019 to take place in Africa. The conference objective was to set the stage for the upcoming 2026 Russia-Africa Summit to be held in Ethiopia in October, and the secondary goal was to begin drafting the 2026–2029 strategic action plan between Russia and Africa. [2] [3] This paper, the rst in a series of four, will analyze Russian and Chinese interests and in uence in Africa, and provide an overview of their use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments to advance their goals on the continent. Africa arguably matters more for Russia and China than it has at any time in recent history, for several reasons. For Russia, its relations with African states serve to demonstrate that Western attempts to isolate it have failed. In addition, Africa’s volatile security environment—to which Russia sometimes contributes—o ers fertile ground for Moscow’s newly minted Africa Corps (the latest incarnation of the notorious Wagner Group) to operate. For China, Africa is a key node in its attempt to establish an alternative system of global order centered on Beijing. China’s agship economic and security initiatives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Security Initiative (GSI), are all active in Africa.
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