Russia and China in Africa

Russia and China in Africa: Interests, Inuence, and Instruments of Power

For both Russia and China, Africa oers another advantage over many parts of the world: a light US footprint, set to get even lighter as the Trump administration focuses US foreign policy on the Western Hemisphere. Since Moscow and Beijing believe the US is determined to limit their freedom of action in areas of the world it deems important, the relative lack of US presence in Africa oers opportunities that other areas do not. This may prove a double-edged sword: with the US often seen as the “binding agent” in Russian-Chinese relations, the two may nd that—absent the incentive to cooperate against the US—their interests in Africa are not as aligned as they seem.

Russian and Chinese Interests in Africa

Russia’s view of Africa is largely instrumental, and its activities there are self-serving. Moscow’s African goals revolve around reasserting its great power status, countering Western inuence, proting from arms sales and security contracts, accessing natural resources, and gaining UN support for (or at least limiting UN condemnation of) its invasion of Ukraine. It has had at least moderate success in all of these areas. Russia’s great power status is an obsession of the Kremlin generally shared by the Russian people. Public opinion polls consistently show the Russian people perceive their country’s great power status as an important goal, and the number of Russians who believe their country is a great power has risen vefold since 2013. Moscow’s diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa serves the goal of building its great power identity, especially when it can erode Western inuence and undermine Western interests in the process. It has especially focused on doing so in the Sahel, by leveraging dissatisfaction with Western peacekeeping and counterterrorism missions and the conditionality that comes with Western assistance. [4] In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic, Russia has replaced international military forces after convincing local governments that Russian Africa Corps forces would be a more eective and less intrusive partner. While this has allowed Moscow to raise its military prole in Africa at the expense of the West, it has incurred more losses than gains for its eorts. Mali provides a case in point here. Although it was “advertised as a agship for Russia’s Africa strategy,” Mali has proven to be inhospitable ground for Russian mercenaries, who suered a total military defeat to Tuareg separatist forces in July 2024, and were unable to prevent a move toward Mali’s capital by an al-Qaeda aliate known as JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal- Muslimin) more recently. [5] But Africa Corps deployments to Africa serve more than military and reputational goals for the Kremlin. Where Moscow’s mercenaries go in Africa, resource extraction often follows. The goal is twofold: gaining resources for Russia and “dislodging Western companies from an area of strategic importance.” In every country in which they operate, Russian mercenaries “have secured valuable natural resources using these to not only cover costs, but also extract signicant revenue.” Russia extracted some $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa between 2022 and 2024 alone . Whether Russia will continue to accept military losses for economic gains is unclear, but it is clear that Africa Corps deployments serve multiple purposes for the Kremlin. [6] [7] [8]

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