Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Russian interests in Africa also center on limiting the diplomatic and reputational damage from its war on Ukraine. Due to its lack of a colonial history in Africa and memories of Soviet support for African liberation movements, Moscow enjoyed a reservoir of goodwill among many African governments. Since February 2022, it has drawn on this goodwill to in uence the UN votes of African states, especially where Ukraine is concerned. Africa routinely has the highest proportion of countries abstaining from or voting against UN resolutions condemning Russia. Immediately after the full-scale invasion, South Africa led a bloc of African countries that abstained from the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Moscow’s aggression. Although over 81% of non-African member states voted for the resolution, only 51% of African members did, underlining the fact that African UN members’ opinion on fault for the war is split. This pattern continues today with African states less willing to condemn Russia than other UN members. [9] Underlining Russia’s instrumental attitude toward Africa is the fact that it has been a fertile recruiting ground for the Russian military, with many Africans sent to ght in Ukraine. Ukraine’s government says over 1,400 Africans are ghting for Russia there, often having been lured to Ukraine on pretense. Luring Africans to ght at the front in Ukraine converts Africa’s poverty to Russia’s advantage, and recruiting foreigners avoids having to mobilize urban ethnic Russians, a move that could carry a high political cost for the Kremlin. [10] [11] China frames its activities and objectives in Africa as win-win—sometimes making good on that promise and other times failing to do so. China’s interests in Africa are broader, more comprehensive, and more formally integrated than Russia’s interests. Where Russia often informally parlays security assistance into resource extraction, China has formal programs aimed at bolstering security (GSI), building the infrastructure of a global trading system (BRI), and enabling economic development (GDI). The overall goal of these programs is to establish a new global order based on China’s vision of itself and its role in the world. Africa matters for this vision for two reasons: its economic potential and the threats to that potential posed by the continent’s seemingly eternal problems of ethnic, religious, and political violence. As Forbes notes, Africa boasts a “rapidly expanding population, abundant natural resources, and rising digital connectivity,” giving it high potential for growth in consumer goods, nancial services, and high-tech. But it is also beset by terrorism, insurgency, piracy, and other forms of mass violence, and these directly a ect both China’s economic investments and its ability to bring Chinese goods to African markets and vice versa. For this reason, two of Beijing’s most important geographic focus areas on the continent are the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, where trade routes and instability intersect. [12]
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