Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strongly believes that development and security are linked, and this informs Beijing’s initiatives in Africa, as elsewhere. For the CCP, economic development creates the conditions for long-term security and stability. In the short term, especially in environments like those found in much of Africa, lack of security threatens the type of investment that can enable development. For this reason, China’s security and economic activities in Africa are tightly linked. Partly to protect its investments in Africa, China has a military base in Djibouti, one of only two outside its borders. It has also invested heavily in training African police and lawyers, training over 40,000 from some 40 African countries. Finally, Beijing is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations on the continent, with some 80% of all Chinese peacekeepers deployed to Africa. In all, over 32,000 Chinese soldiers have served in UN missions there, the highest number among permanent members of the UN Security Council. [13] [14]
One area where Chinese and Russian activities in Africa align is in garnering UN votes from African countries. Like Russia, China leverages its history of support for Africa’s anti-colonial movements into support in the UN, especially on issues related to Taiwan.
Russian and Chinese In uence in Africa
Both Russia and China inherited a reservoir of goodwill from many African states, a result of the fact that neither Moscow nor Beijing had a colonial history in Africa, and that both supported African anti-colonial movements during the Cold War. This is especially true of Russia, and especially true in South Africa, where memories of the Soviet Union’s support for the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) run deep. After the end of apartheid and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western leaders pressed new South African President Nelson Mandela about why he supported Russia and its agenda. Mandela angrily replied that the Soviet Union had been the only international source of support for the ANC as it battled apartheid. On a 1999 visit to Moscow, Mandela made his gratitude clear, saying “We received enormous assistance from the Soviet Union, an assistance which we could not get from the West and Russia should have been the very rst country I visited and I’ve come to pay that debt now.” [15] [16] Russia also has current sources of in uence in Africa, some of which stem from Africans’ frustration with Western assistance. As noted earlier, the Wagner Group/Africa Corps successfully leveraged frustration with Western peacekeeping and counterterrorism missions in the Sahel, convincing several countries in that region to eject Western forces and replace them with Russian mercenaries. As Dan Whitman notes, Russia’s presence and activities are self-serving, but many Africans expect this and are unperturbed by it, preferring naked sel shness to what they see as Western hypocrisy. Whitman argues that Russian narratives appeal especially “to young Africans who are fed up with the Western presence. With justi cation, they see the West as having supported regimes, not people.” Tying Russia’s in uence back to the Soviet Union’s support for African liberation movements, Whitman concludes, “Adding a few lies to a sound anti-colonial narrative has served it well.” [17] [18]
Page 4
Made with FlippingBook flipbook maker