Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
But there are clear limits to Moscow’s in uence in Africa. Some of these are structural and out of Moscow’s control, and some are a result of its own actions. In the latter category is the fact that Russia focuses on ties with elites and generally ignores the needs of African populations. This is especially true of the Africa Corps, which focuses on regime protection while neglecting the needs of ordinary Africans or committing grave human rights violations against them. A 2025 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) alleges that Russian mercenaries in Africa “regularly shared photos and videos of murder, rape, torture, cannibalism, and desecration of corpses against alleged insurgents and civilians.” [19] The structural reasons for Russia’s limited in uence in Africa mostly devolve from comparing its presence and activities with those of China. Russia may have inherited a slightly deeper reservoir of historical goodwill than did China—the Soviet Union was an earlier and more active supporter of African anti-colonial movements than was the People’s Republic of China. But China has more than made up for this through its contemporary role on the continent. Beijing’s large, broad-based, institutionalized presence in Africa, which encompasses the diplomatic, security, and economic spheres, is seen as a generally positive force among African publics. China has the highest favorability rating of major powers among African publics, with 60% of those surveyed approving of its role and only 19% disapproving. Russia, by comparison, has the lowest favorability rating, with only 36% assessing its role as positive. [20] Aside from the Russian crimes against civilians and support for elites at the expense of African populations, there are two main reasons for the di erence in favorability ratings. First is the size of China’s presence in Africa, which dwarfs Russia’s by any measure. China has embassies in all 54 African countries, while Russia is present in only 39 of them. Chinese aid, trade, and investment are orders of magnitude greater than those of Russia: Beijing’s trade with the continent in 2024 totaled $295 billion compared to only $24.5 billion for Russia. The next reason is that Chinese aid focuses on tangible projects that meet the needs of ordinary Africans. As one African scholar put it, China invests in physical infrastructure projects and nishes them quickly, both of which people like. Any resentment over Chinese activities in Africa often stems from labor practices, which have [22] historically favored bringing in Chinese workers for infrastructure projects rather than hiring Africans. Where Chinese rms do hire Africans, they have been accused of subjecting Africans to substandard working conditions and violating labor laws. [23] [21] In a direct comparison of Russian and Chinese in uence in Africa, the latter is clearly superior. Russia’s reservoir of historical goodwill has proven no match for its present-day activities, which often end up hurting ordinary Africans far more than helping them. And it has proven no match for China’s activities that, despite shortcomings, are seen in a generally positive light. In fact, one African scholar noted that Russia is so far behind China in Africa that it risks not being taken seriously. For a government and people obsessed with being acknowledged as a great power, this may be the ultimate insult. [24]
Page 5
Made with FlippingBook flipbook maker