Russia and China in Africa

Russia and China in Africa: Interests, Inuence, and Instruments of Power

Of course, instruments of power are rarely deployed individually. They are most often deployed together, as part of a policy or strategy. In statecraft, as E.H. Carr notes, “power is an indivisible whole; one instrument cannot exist for long in the absence of the others.” This paper denes the instruments of power as follows: [25]

The represents the power of persuasion. This includes negotiations, oral and written diplomatic communications, as well as the political systems and trajectories of states, including the extent to which their domestic political regime types align. diplomatic instrument [26] The encompasses the eorts of governments to disseminate and collect information in an eort to tell a government’s story to an audience with the hope of building support for it. informational instrument [27] The includes, but is not limited to, the capabilities inherent in the armed forces and other security services of a state. This may or may not include military operations; arms sales, exercises, and military education and training also comprise the military instrument. For this paper, Russian and Chinese security contractors, like Russia’s Africa Corps, are also included in the military instrument. In the positive sense, this might include trade, economic aid, and foreign direct investment; in the negative sense, this includes actions like sanctions, taris, embargoes, or even blockades (although this also requires use of the military instrument). economic instrument [29] military instrument [28] The leverages a state’s wealth to inuence others.

Image: Delivery of ten Russian BRDM-2 armored vehicles to Central African Republic. Oct 15, 2020 Image Source: UN Security Council, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

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