Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Russia
Moscow’s use of the diplomatic instrument in Africa re ects the fact that the continent is of moderate but rising importance to the Kremlin. As noted, Russia operates embassies in 39 of Africa’s 54 countries, and those embassies tend to be smaller than those of China, the US, or other major powers. With its permanent presence limited, Russia has tried to make up for this with high-level diplomatic visits, especially since its full- scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who had never visited Africa before 2022, made four visits there in the rst 18 months after the war began. In this period, he visited Egypt, Congo (Brazzaville), Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa (twice), Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Angola, Eritrea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Kenya, Burundi, and Mozambique. Finally, he represented Putin at the August 2023 BRICS Summit in South Africa, which the Russian president skipped due to the arrest warrant issued for him by the International Criminal Court (ICC). [30] [31] Russia’s use of the information instrument has also increased since the start of the war in Ukraine, re ecting Moscow’s desire to see its narrative on the war dominate in the Global South. It also seeks to use the Global South to demonstrate that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed. Some of Moscow’s use of information is directly tied to the operations of Moscow’s mercenaries, and some is more general in scope and tone. Information campaigns tied to mercenary operations have supported Wagner Group deployments in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, as well as later Africa Corps deployments in Burkina Faso and Niger. These campaigns often merged with existing anti-French and anti-colonial themes, although they also contained pro-Russian talking points. This activity has been ampli ed across the Sahel by Russian media operations, including the Africa Initiative, which has recruited and trained pro-Russian in uencers and journalists from several countries across the region. Themes of Russian information operations in these countries include celebrating military rule, undermining popular support for democracy, and portraying Russia as a trusted partner for Africa. Russia increasingly uses arti cial intelligence (AI) to support its information e orts in Africa, using AI-generated videos, fabricated endorsements, and highly coordinated social media ampli cation to raise support for Russia and the regimes it supports. In some cases, this has made leaders like Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré into social media superstars, by “endowing him with impeccable American English and a power of persuasion far exceeding his own.” [32] [33] [34] Russia leads with the military instrument in Africa, closely supported by the informational instrument, which it has employed with increasing intensity since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moscow often attempts to parlay its military activities into economic gains, but otherwise its economic presence in Africa is small, especially compared to China’s.
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