Succession and the Ottoman Sultanate
leadership as provincial governors, but more importantly, in the struggle for power under the previous tradition, generally only candidates who were strong, politically able and supported by the army became Sultan. While these policy changes meant there were not civil wars at the beginning of a succession, it can be argued that they only delayed conflict till later, particularly with increased intrigue and scheming post-1603: with weaker or younger Sultans there was more scope for grand viziers or the Sultan’s mother to take control. Mehmed IV, only seven when he came to power in 1648, was to become known as ‘the hunter’ for his addiction to hunting: this lack of concern for state matters, particularly after the catastrophe of the second siege of Vienna and advance of the Sacra Ligua, 107 contributed to his overthrow by the Janissaries in 1687, and military rule for four months, a similar revolt to those seen before 1603, just coming at the end of a reign rather than the start. Apart from missing leadership skills there is another factor to consider in relation to Sultans’ characters: in his book ‘The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform’ Walter F. Weiker talks about how, by the time bureaucrats, intent on much-needed reform, reached positions where they could implement change, they found themselves ‘deeply committed to Ottoman values’. Similarly, princes brought up in the ‘Kafes’ of Topkapi (the seclusion and restrictions of which, George Dunea in the British Medical Journal suggests, could well have seen them become ‘imbeciles’) 108 might easily suffer from the same inculcation of Ottoman ‘values’, such as stifling conservatism, leading to continual failure to reform the declining empire. Intrigue and scheming were still rife after the change in succession. As already stated, the Sultans’ youth and inexperience allowed for manipulation, particularly by grand viziers (often incompetent men, like Kara Mustafa, whose poor leadership, tactics and diplomacy are often cited as key to the siege of Vienna’s failure in 1683), or the Sultan’s mother, the 107 An alliance, instigated by Pope Innocent XI, of European powers united (to a greater or lesser degree) against the Ottomans 108 Examples being Ibrahim who fed coins to fish or Mustafa I who wandered the rooms of his Palace calling for his dead brother Osman II
‘Walide Sultan’. For example, from 1617 to 1623, three Walide Sultans (mothers of Mustafa I, Osman II and Murad IV) were involved in schemes for their children’s advancement which destabilized the empire. The Ulama (or Ulema) were Islamic scholars who also took opportunities provided by malleable rulers to direct policy. Throughout Ottoman history these scholars were particularly conservative, 109 so held back reforms and caused disruption by conspiring against Sultans, such as the deposing of Mustafa I and issuing a fatwa for the execution of Ibrahim. While the grand viziers, family members and Ulama had always had power to some degree, because of less competent Sultans, after 1603 their influence was stronger and many Sultans found themselves deposed and murdered, not by their brothers in the race to be crowned, but by their own officials. Furthermore, because now the post of grand vizier was more influential, there was increased competition for it, and for that of ‘serder’, the military commander, leading to more disputes and conflicts that contributed to imperial decline. An interesting example is that of Koca Sinan Pasha; 110 his absence from Constantinople with the army, and Sultan Murad III’s death in 1595, allowed a rival, Ferhad Pasha, to become grand vizier, undermining Sinan Pasha’s, and thus the empire’s, military pursuits and causing such divisions over loyalty that that spring saw violence on Istanbul’s streets and the planned attack on Wallachia was severely affected. Admittedly this example comes before the date of succession change, but it is an example of the problems that arose from competition for power in the empire, and this competition and power increased after 1603. The case of Sinan Pasha provides an example of another increasingly prevalent problem after the Sultans personally led the army less. In 1577, both he and Lala Mustafa Pasha were generals on the Eastern front but their rivalry meant plans for a joint assault against the Caucasus and Iraq had to be abandoned. With all-powerful Sultans these problems did not 109 For example, murdering a progressive grand vizier in 1785 110 See ‘Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700’ by Rhoades Murphey for details (p137-141).
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