Succession and the Ottoman Sultanate
arise. Similarly, Sultans could reward and punish without fear of contradiction, which helped army discipline. For example, in 1649 the commander of forces in Crete, Deli Hüseyn Pasha, had to refer to Istanbul when his army demanded much deserved leave after two years fighting in Candia. When distant officials decreed that only certain Janissaries should have leave, the army rebelled, ending fighting for that season. In a system where rewards, 111 both given and promised, were so important, a capable Sultan who led the army was important and occurred less frequently after 1603 as weaker and less dynamic Sultans succeeded. However, some of these arguments against the change need to be examined. While there were some weak sultans after 1603, there were also exceptions. Murad IV (1623-1640) was particularly strong, leading his army in the east, notably capturing Baghdad in 1638. He also undermined the plotting of the court, banning tobacco, alcohol and coffee and thus the discussions of revolution that arenas like bars and coffee houses propagated. Similarly in 1826 Mahmud II killed 5,000-6,000 Janissaries opposed to reforms, and Ahmed I tried to regulate officials. Equally, some rulers were weak before 1603, while Selim I owed so much to the army who had supported him that they were able to influence when campaigns took place and there was little chance of reforming them. While officials did have more power under the new system, this could be beneficial. Often grand viziers were chosen especially for their skills and so were more likely to be good administrators and rulers. In 1656, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha proved an excellent example. He purged the army and civil service, with between 50,000-60,000 victims; not particularly humane but certainly effective, as the ending of Anatolian rebellions and success in Venetian wars demonstrate. Moreover, arguably, since princes relied so heavily on the Janissaries to become Sultan and these soldiers would be loathe to support anyone who might reform them, only candidates conservative in approach took power. Hence, the fact that the throne was now inherited
allowed leaders like Mahmud II or Selim III, who tried to implement change, to come into power, and this was beneficial in the face of conservative elements like the Ulama. The Janissaries and army had a large part to play here and it is useful to look at them in more depth. It can be argued that, unlike in the old system where support was a necessity, many new leaders did not have the army’s backing, and thus revolutions by the standing army ( hünkâr kulu) became more common and increased Ottoman decline. Certainly there are many cases of Janissaries or Sipahis (cavalry) of the Porte revolting and removing rulers after 1603. For example, 18 th May 1622 saw an uprising of troops who feared Osman II was making a pre-emptive strike on them; after making a deal with Mustafa’s mother Osman was strangled just two days later and Mustafa came to power. 112 On the other hand, it would be wrong to say such revolts were confined to reigns after that of Ahmed I. In 1446 dissatisfaction over wages led to the Janissaries removing Mehmed II and suspending his succession till 1451 and, as already noted, reliance on the army could get in the way of reforms and conquest as in Selim I’s case. Clearly the consequences of the change in succession that occurred at this mid-point in Ottoman history are complicated. The Empire did deteriorate after this time, but is this an example of correlation rather than causation? Taking, for example, the biggest charge against the new system, namely the army’s revolts under weak sultans, there are other reasons to be noted: the loss of the elite status of Janissaries as recruitment was relaxed meant discipline fell, while their idleness from an inability to increase the empire (due to external forces and the geography of border areas) along with a worsening economy all contributed to rebellions and revolutions. It seems the change in Ottoman succession was neither definitively harmful nor beneficial to the empire. On balance I think that the lack of the strong leadership which the old system provided was disadvantageous to the Ottoman state. However, when it comes to the big
112 For the second time (having been deposed in 1617), though he would be removed again the next year by the Ulama
111 particularly salary promotions ( terakki), cash bonuses ( bahşiş), and spoils ( ganimet)
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