Immigration
provision (OECD, 2023) despite having large numbers of immigrants, 2 suggesting homogeneity is not needed for democratic welfare states, yet this could be problematic due to discriminatory reasons.
It is important to note that some ‘public culture’ can be obtained voluntarily: one can learn a language, celebrate traditions, and adopt new values and principles. Indeed, there are parts of ‘public culture’ that are harder to assimilate into (those grounded in religious or ethnic contexts), but in the long run most immigrants are able to assimilate socially, especially second-generation immigrants (Portes, A. et al., 2009). This means that justification for selecting culturally proximate immigrants decreases, as states can invest in programmes—language courses, immigrant credential recognition, civic orientation, and antidiscrimination enforcement—to invite less culturally proximate immigrants to integrate over time. The important duty, therefore, is that states invest in integration infrastructure for migrants to thrive. The legitimacy of any cultural consideration depends on states first meeting these obligations. Where governments deliberately underfund integration programmes while claiming cultural incompatibility justifies restriction, their claims lack standing. Integration spending should be proportionate to admissions, and outcome gaps between migrants and natives should narrow over time. Temporary capacity constraints signal the need for expanded investment, not grounds for exclusion. Only where states demonstrate sustained, adequate investment yet reach the threshold outlined in the introduction would a state be justified in limiting immigration to protect cultural practices. Selection process We shall examine states’ selection process further because some states limit certain migrants based on their cultural proximity. While cultural considerations possess some legitimacy in principle, proximity-based selection could entail discriminatory mechanisms in practice, undermining the principle. Australia's points system prioritizes English proficiency, youth, and western education credentials (Migration Observatory, 2021). Australia, Canada, and New Zealand all select a majority of university-educated migrants. 3 While appearing merit-based, these criteria correlate directly with national origin, systematically advantaging western applicants while disadvantaging developing country nationals. Similarly, the EU's Community Preference Principle (European Parliament, 2017) enshrines proximity discrimination directly, creating two-tiered mobility rights dependent on national origin, where non-EU citizens have higher barriers than EU citizens to work across different EU countries (Robin-Olivier, 2016). Although states with imperial histories have a moral duty to remediate harms caused, cultural preferences and selection criteria create the opposite effect. Colonial exploitation created the educational and economic disparities that now disadvantage developing country nationals from migration opportunities to the very states that benefited from exploitation. The asymmetry is stark: a 2 Note that Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have a 31%, 28%, and 24% foreign-born population, some of the highest in the world excluding microstates. (Statistics Canada, 2021), (Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2024), (Stats NZ, 2018). 3 79% in Australia, 66% in New Zealand, 55% in Canada (all past 10 years since most recent census) (Statistics Canada, 2021), (Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2024), (Stats NZ, 2018).
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