The Assisted Dying Bill
extended, the potential benefits you would lose out on by upholding the terminally ill restriction would have to substantially outweigh the established risks of the slippery slope.
One final point that needs to be explored is whether the moral discrepancy between terminal and non- terminal euthanasia is small enough to mean that you cannot justify one without including the other. Looking at the main arguments in favour of euthanasia for the terminally ill, it could be argued that the same chains of reasoning could also be applied to non-terminal cases. For example, the argument from autonomy states that competent people should have the right to choose their own fates, so long as others are not hurt by their actions. This is a principle advanced by philosopher John Stuart Mill and originally used to defend individual freedoms against tyranny (Taylor, 2017), but which has also evolved to apply to assisted dying (Gunderson and Mayo, 2000, pp. 18-19). After all, if a person has their life largely compromised by disease, they should have the right to determine when their time to die will come. However, the argument from autonomy cannot exclusively be used for the terminally ill. If someone is suffering severely from an untreatable disease but is still estimated to live another 5-10 years of their lives, they should still qualify for physician assisted suicide using the argument’s logic. It is worth mentioning that, going back to the Nuffield survey, 57% of those who agreed with PAD for the terminally ill said that their main reason to do so was because they believed in a person’s right to autonomy (Nuffield Bioethics, p. 16). So, why should a person’s right to freedom of choice be dependent on how long they have left to live? Likewise, the argument from compassion follows a similar route, suggesting that as compassionate people we should minimize the suffering of others, so physicians’ duties extend beyond curing people and also aim to alleviate pain. In regard to assisted dying, severe terminal illnesses can often lead to extreme suffering for the patient, including mental anguish as people lose dignity and control over their bodies. In these cases, if the patient no longer wants to live in such a state, the most compassionate action would be for them to be killed quickly and without pain, rather than to let them die slowly and much more painfully (Rachels, 1975, p. 2). The argument from compassion was pioneered by philosopher James Rachels and became one of the most striking arguments in favour of euthanasia overall. However, Rachels’ reasoning fails to differentiate between terminal and non-terminal cases. It could be maintained that similar considerations should also be applied to those who will suffer for years to come (Gunderson and Mayo, 2000, p. 18). Therefore, why are we kind enough to help the terminally ill, but don’t have the same obligation for those who are projected to be in just as much pain but for an even longer period? There is a further case to be made against confining assisted dying to the terminally ill, known as the argument from vagueness. It points out that the definition of ‘terminal’ is quite problematic, as many people are predicted to die in the very near future by doctors but surpass their expectations, continuing to live on for years longer than anticipated (Ho, 2015, p. 6). After all, doctors are not psychics. Therefore, if attempts to define terminal illness are often incorrect, it should not be used as a threshold for PAD, as otherwise certain people will be wrongfully included or excluded in the legislation’s criteria.
In theory, the arguments from autonomy, compassion and vagueness all provide good evidence for why we cannot solely restrict assisted dying to the terminally ill. In particular, the arguments from autonomy
182
Made with FlippingBook - PDF hosting