between the mind and the physical world, by which it is created and which it can itself alter. One way to resolve this problem is to assert that either one (but not both) of the mind and the physical world do not exist, and thus that there is no mysterious gap to be jumped. However, since the mind has the capacity to self-examine, and therefore to be aware of its own existence, it seems perfectly obvious that if we can assume anything at all, it is the existence of our own mind. The second of these resolutions (that the mind exists but that the physical world does not) may be called solipsism. This I must reject out of hand because of the vast emphasis it places on the objective of who created our mind and the illusory world it experiences. If I am merely a brain in a tank in some laboratory, who put me there – and what do they want⁄? Even if no such all-powerful intellect is necessary for the adoption of solipsism, the belief that my own mind is the only thing in existence in any universe seems to be based on a [philosophy] that is in the dark. In any case the existence of both the mind and the physical universe seems far more plausible. Thus it is safe to assume that both the mind and body exist, the problem arising when trying to explain the causal link between the two. Materialists assert that the mind and all related phenomena have the same ÂingredientsÊ as the physical world, and hence the existence and activity of the mind could at least in theory be explained as nothing more than a scientific textbook. However the virtual mind which we experience is characterized by non-physical imaginings. Memory, for example, allows for the recollections of the qualia details of some environment or experience in which, however, we do not reside at the instant when we remember. How could the experience of memory in some virtual entity, ÂmindÊ, be caused by the back- and-forth of matter and electrical charge in a piece of flesh? More precisely, our experience, observations and recollections of qualia do not seem to correspond to any conceivable
physical process. Mental states such as ÂbeliefÊ have no obvious physical counterpart. The distinction dawn by Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson is between ÂbeliefÊ and Âbelief controlÊ. Say if there were some area of the brain which Âlit upÊ when we believe something. The phenomenon of belief may well be ÂpresentÊ in this part of the brain, and yet physical activity gives no clue as to the actual nature of the belief itself. It seems implausible that by scientific analysis of a brain that we could, for example, discern what an individual is thinking – think it ourselves, even. In the same way, the famous example of Mary locked in a black- and-white room with all scientific knowledge at her disposal, including the way in which the brain receives and interprets the phenomenon of ÂblueÊ seems to suggest that her knowledge of the world would be hugely impoverished by her never having experienced the qualia of seeing a blue object – despite the fact that according to a strictly materialist theory, she could know everything that it is possible to know. Even if, as some have argued, we interpret the scientific explanation of ÂblueÊ and the visual experience of it as merely two aspects of the same phenomenon (and thus she does indeed know everything), there still remains a necessary distinction to be drawn between a scientific explanation of an experience and the experience itself. For if there is no such distinction, we allow MaryÊs mind to be able to imagine the colour blue - an absurdity, since the conscious intellect has no discernable bearing on its sensual experience. Another issue is the problem of ownership. If ÂqualicÊ experience may be explained via purely physical means, then just as two minds can experience the same seeing of a table, we must surely be able to experience the same emotion, the same blue, the same belief or [intention]. Just as physical experience may be shared, being caused by some physical interactions between matter, so too must minds share intellectual and qualic experiences. This is, however,
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