Gödel is! Such a mind would not be able to conclude the First Theorem and therefore our minds cannot be made up of the strict physical laws which would lead to strict logical inference. Though a dualist, I must reject this argument as a [fudge]. The theorems apply to primitive reclusive number – theoretic axiomatic systems, while the human mind is surely something different entirely. The Gödelian approach has been called Âphilosophically harmlessÊ, and yet it requires a more than generous interpretation of a strictly mathematical Theorem which has strictly defined preconditions. The one idea that I do accept from the treatment of the mind as some variety of an axiomatic, computer-like system is that no mathematical theory can accommodate error. If the brainÊs neurons obeyed the strict logical laws implied by the materialist treatment of the brain, we would not make mistakes though inconsistency could arise, as in a mathematical theory, from inconsistent axioms, it seems highly unlikely that this system could arise from materialistic origin. The precise phenomenon which we all consciousness has no scientific basis or causality. The fact that the mind is independent from, and yet may affect our physical world, has no discernible possibility to be explained by a strict scientific model. Explanation of the existence of the mind cannot be achieved by the mind itself. Self- examination seems inescapable fundamentally.
impossible, as pain, pleasure or the colour blue cannot be communicated except by ÂgarbledÊ means. My description of a distinctive smell does not allow you to experience it exactly as I do. The second problem of the Âriddle of consciousnessÊ is the idea of self-reference. In no part of the physical world other than lesser (but intelligent) animals do we observe the capacity to be aware of oneÊs own existence, and modify or analyse it accordingly. This essay is a prime example. My mind has considered its own existence, examined the nature of its sensory experience, and even concluded statements about its relationship with the physical world. The inanimate objects of the physical universe, on the other hand, appear to ÂblindlyÊ obey the various strict physical laws by which they are governed. In consciousness, a sentience exists, which is able to think about and alter its own behaviours. No scientific theory seems able to explain the distinctive trait. Kurt GödelÊs Incompleteness Theorem has been variously abused, by J.R Lucas among others, to deny the materialist position. A simplification of the theorem concludes that a sufficiently rich axiomatic system contains improbable truths. A materialistic mind would constitute a Âfixed set of directivesÊ (Douglas, Newman) by which the purely physical interactions of matter gave rise to the logical mental process. Thus (goes the argument) such a system may be susceptible to the First Theorem and thus contains unprovable truths. This mind would go about its logical business unaware of anything it could not prove. But we are – and
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