The framework for China’s security presence in Africa is the GSI, which seeks to offer an alternative model of security to that offered by the US and the West, and to address causes of insecurity that threaten China’s economic interests. The Chinese government articulates the goals of the GSI as presenting Beijing as a “dispute arbiter, architect of new regional security frameworks, and trainer of security professionals and police forces in developing countries.” China has become the dominant seller of military equipment to Africa, overtaking Russia, and selling to some 70% of African militaries, with states like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia buying over 90% of their weapons from China. Major items sold include jet trainers, armored personnel carriers, anti-ship missiles, and combat drones. [45] Africa is the location of China’s first overseas military base, opened in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa in 2017, and there have been persistent rumors of another base planned for Equatorial Guinea, on Africa’s Atlantic coast. Having bases in both regions would make sense, given China’s integration of its security and economic goals in Africa. Many of its most important BRI projects are in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, both important trade routes but also both beset by piracy, terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of mass violence. Of course, a base in Equatorial Guinea could also act as a springboard for greater Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic Ocean, something US policymakers greet with alarm. Like Russia, China has a robust private military and security company (PMSC) presence in Africa. But Chinese and Russian PMSCs operate differently and have different goals. Chinese security firms are generally employed to protect Chinese BRI projects and other investments, and most but not all operate unarmed. With over 10,000 Chinese businesses operating in Africa and some one million Chinese living there, the scale of Beijing’s economic presence - and accompanying security vulnerability - is clear. Estimates suggest that some 3200 Chinese PMSC personnel operate overseas, with the vast majority of these in Africa: about 2000 contractors from a single Chinese firm operate in Ethiopia and Kenya alone. The final two forms of Chinese security presence in Africa are its UN peacekeepers and its police forces. Over 80% of Chinese peacekeepers are deployed to Africa, and over 32,000 Chinese soldiers have served in UN missions there, the highest number among permanent members of the UN Security Council. Beijing’s police presence in Africa is less benign, serving largely to keep tabs on Chinese citizens living there, and by agreement with many African countries, to extradite them back to China to face punishment. [49] It is in the use of the economic instrument where China’s presence and power in Africa become clear. By every economic measure, China dwarfs Russia on the continent. Beijing’s engagement is deep, broad, and focused on the long-term with massive investments in infrastructure (BRI), huge trade turnover, and significant foreign direct investment (FDI). Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the construction and telecoms sectors. [44] [46] [47] [48]
// RUSSIA AND CHINA IN AFRICA Delphi Global Research Center
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