Napoleon and Egypt
The failure of communication during Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt, however, helped to exacerbate the issues already prevalent throughout the French invasion. Throughout his time in Egypt, internal communication was continually disrupted by Bedouin tribes who relentlessly attacked caravans travelling between French settlements. Bedouin people were nomads, raiding tribes and villages as they moved through the deserts; they responded to no Imperial power, meaning it was very difficult to control them. One of Napoleon’s generals, Menou, was attacked by Bedouins whilst leading an expedition into the Nile Delta in which a savant was killed. 12 Even after expanding French influence towards Suez, Napoleon’s communication lines through Upper Egypt continued to be mercilessly targeted by them. Therefore, despite increasing French presence in the region, the local population continued to challenge French rule and authority – another sign of continued Mameluke loyalty. Therefore, without the correct information and news reaching Napoleon’s headquarters from around Egypt, he could not react adequately or quickly enough to challenges to his rule throughout the country, thus rendering his grasp in Egypt weaker. Moreover, the British blockade of Alexandria rendered communication between Paris and Napoleon near impossible. Due to the naval blockade, messages and those carrying them were often captured by the British so that Nelson knewmore about what was happening in France thanNapoleon did. Messages were rarely conveyed to Napoleon and were done so at great expense to avoid the British and Bedouin who would try and kill and capture Frenchmen. A message dispatched on the 6 July from Paris found Napoleon on 8 September, congratulating him a few months too late on taking Malta. 13 Messages from Paris rarely got through to their recipient – if they did, they were uselessly out of date. This also led to a fatal misunderstanding: Napole on had convinced himself that the Porte had been convinced of France’s right to invade Egypt (Ottoman sovereign territory) and thus did not fear war. In reality, the Porte had declared war with France following Napoleon’s arrival in Alexandria. The Directo ry 14 could not communicate the truth with Napoleon due to the Naval blockade, thus Napoleon was not aware of an enemy he had created which would begin to invade the country very quickly after his return to France. Finally, the ultimate reason for the failu re of Napoleon’s expedition was France’s dwindling position in Europe. The second coalition of Austria, Britain and Russia was at war with France; furthermore, the French had been pushed back across the Rhine by Austria which resulted in a tactical French withdrawal from Switzerland. Additionally, most of the territory conquered by Napoleon in northern Italy had been reclaimed by Austria and the French were now in retreat towards Genoa. Strathern described that ‘ Napoleon came to an instant decision ’ because ‘ only he could save the country ’ . 15 Kléber, left in charge after the commander-in- chief’s return to France in October 1799, said: ‘ Bonaparte, after his departure, left not a sou in the till, not even any bills of credit. ’ 16 The French had suffered considerable losses in the Syrian conquest before Napoleon’s departure, spending much money, eventually being defeated by Ottoman-supported Syrians at Jaffa – gaining no land and wasting time, money and lives. The financial shortcomings, combined with the naval blockade, meant the French could not bring more troops to Egypt to help subdue the population. Furthermore, the Porte had finally drawn up an army, and which was mercilessly taking back Egyptian territory. This dire situation led Kléber to successfully negotiate a
12 Strathern 2007: 221-2. 13 Strathern 2007: 223. 14 The committee of five members governing France at the time. 15 Strathern 2007: 400. 16 Rousseau, M. 1900 : 78-80.
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