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the drive and the object preserves both drive availability (for psychic work) and the contingency of the object (possibilities for substitution and displacement), even when seeking to institute limits to the drive’s overflow. A first hypothesis is that in “difficult cases” the heart of the problem is not the non- representable but rather the “ non represented ”. It is an attempt at considering different forms of inscription and removal of repression and early traumas, which, as per Green (1993), requires the analysis of the impact of the negative, which goes beyond the sole consideration of neurosis as the negative of perversion. When the problem changes and revolves around being or having the object, in the clinical practice, when the classical approach is insufficient, what is known about the place and the functions of the analyst has to be revised. There are compelling metapsychological arguments to support a differentiation between the enactment, as the possibility for the expression of repressed unconscious processes, and the repetition in action (acting out), with the implication of different analytic approaches to working through. Jamie Spilka (2008) questions what Rosas de Salas proposes regarding the “non represented”, as forms of inscription and ‘removal’ that are different from repression. He wonders whether such a proposal could be a methodological error because of its simple linear chronology of psychic times. Instead, Spilka proposes the circular time of the après-coup , stating, “rather, they are different forms of processing the presentation itself, a complex issue which, as such, already implies a complicated passage through symbolic castration, with all the delicate discrimination between Sachvorstellung , Wortvorstellung and Dingvorstellung , (fact presentation, word presentation and thing presentation) and the interdiction of the jouissance in the real introduced by the mythic paternal prophecy ‘this is your mother’”. Spilka’s specific rendition of Lacanian approach inaugurates “the field of unconscious signification” bound to a subjective ‘denaturalization’ rather than any natural empirical signification. Thus, all significations would monotonously imply the same, an interdiction of the jouissance with the real, and it is in that denaturalizing restriction that perhaps every operation of passage of the instinct to the category of drive would be displayed.” For Spilka, “it would be difficult to put forward a psychoanalytic semiology where the problems of the unconscious presentation and the psychic signification in general, could be understood outside the field of the ethical structure of the Oedipus…which generates a succession of retroactivities from a secondary repression to a primary repression…” (Spilka 2008, pp. 163-167). For Rosas de Salas , on the other hand, “In the Freudian works support can be found depending on whether you take what is previous to ‘Beyond the pleasure principle’, which describes a repetition that does not contradict the pleasure principle, or after 1920, where Freud suggests even the repetition of events that were never pleasurable but seek binding. This later understanding of the pleasure principle as the binding and the combinatory binding via the repetition is undoubtedly rich in consequences and is one of the reasons why we choose this perspective to consider the drive and its overflows” (2008, pp. 143-144, emphasis added).
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